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Abstract	
Research	has	shown	that	people	often	reinterpret	their	experiences	of	others’	harm	and	suffering	to	
maintain	the	functional	belief	that	people	get	what	they	deserve	(e.g.,	by	blaming	the	victim).	Rather	
than	focusing	on	such	reactive	responses	to	harm	and	suffering,	across	7	studies	we	examined	
whether	people	selectively	and	proactively	choose	to	be	exposed	to	information	about	deserved	
rather	than	undeserved	outcomes.	We	consistently	found	that	participants	selectively	chose	to	learn	
that	bad	(good)	things	happened	to	bad	(good)	people	(Studies	1	to	7)—that	is,	they	selectively	
exposed	themselves	to	deserved	outcomes.	This	effect	was	mediated	by	the	perceived	
deservingness	of	outcomes	(Studies	2	and	3),	and	was	reduced	when	participants	learned	that	
wrongdoers	otherwise	received	“just	deserts”	for	their	transgressions	(Study	7).	Participants	were	
not	simply	selectively	avoiding	information	about	undeserved	outcomes	but	actively	sought	
information	about	deserved	outcomes	(Studies	3	and	4),	and	participants	invested	effort	in	this	
pattern	of	selective	exposure,	seeking	out	information	about	deserved	outcomes	even	when	it	was	
more	time-consuming	to	find	than	undeserved	outcomes	(Studies	5	and	6).	Taken	together,	these	
findings	cast	light	on	a	more	proactive,	anticipatory	means	by	which	people	maintain	a	commitment	
to	deservingness.	
	
Keywords:	information	seeking;	selective	exposure;	deservingness;	belief	in	a	just	world	 	
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Selective	Exposure	to	Deserved	Outcomes	
A	long	tradition	of	research	into	the	psychology	of	justice	has	demonstrated	that	people	care	
about	the	relationship	between	the	value	of	people	and	the	value	of	their	outcomes—that	is,	they	
care	about	deservingness	(Sabbagh	&	Schmitt,	2016).	Judgments	of	what	is	deserved	or	undeserved	
generally	follow	from	the	subjective	perception	of	the	relation	between	the	value	of	people’s	actions	
and	the	value	of	their	outcomes,	such	that	a	good	(bad)	person	receiving	a	negative	(positive)	
outcome	is	perceived	as	undeserved,	whereas	the	same	good	(bad)	person	receiving	a	positive	
(negative)	outcome	is	seen	as	deserved	(see	Feather,	1999;	Hafer,	2011;	Lerner,	Miller,	&	Holmes,	
1976).	
	Lerner	(1977)	argued	that	people	are	motivated	to	believe	that	they	live	in	a	world	where	
people	generally	get	what	they	deserve,	because	doing	so	enables	them	to	commit	to	long-term	
goals	with	confidence.	Because	believing	in	a	“just-world”	is	functional,	people	often	reinterpret	
their	experiences	of	unjust	events	to	maintain	perceptions	of	deservingness	(for	reviews,	see	Ellard,	
Harvey,	&	Callan,	2016;	Hafer	&	Bègue,	2005).	The	classic	example	of	this	process	is	the	derogation	
of	innocent	victims	(Lerner	&	Simmons,	1966),	but	recent	research	has	cast	light	on	a	variety	of	
other	ways	people	maintain	a	commitment	to	justice	and	deservingness	(Callan	&	Ellard,	2010),	
including	misremembering	details	of	past	injustices	(Callan,	Kay,	Ellard,	&	Davidenko,	2009;	Marsh	&	
Greenberg,	2006),	perceiving	future	benefits	for	a	victim’s	suffering	(Hafer	&	Gosse,	2011;	Harvey	&	
Callan,	2014),	and	offering	to	help	victims	(Bal	&	van	den	Bos,	2015;	Harvey,	Callan,	&	Matthews,	
2015).	
One	feature	cutting	across	these	strategies	for	maintaining	a	commitment	to	justice	and	
deservingness	is	that	they	involve	people’s	reactive	responses	to	harm	and	suffering.	Take,	for	
example,	immanent	justice	reasoning,	which	involves	believing	that	a	bad	outcome	was	caused	by	
someone’s	prior	immoral	behavior,	however	physically	implausible	such	a	causal	connection	might	
be	(Callan,	Sutton,	Harvey,	&	Dawtry,	2014).	Harvey	and	Callan	(2014)	found	that	participants	
causally	attributed	a	freak	car	accident	to	the	victim’s	prior	conduct	to	a	greater	extent	when	he	
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previously	stole	from	children	(vs.	did	not	steal).	Further,	participants’	beliefs	about	what	he	
deserved	mediated	these	causal	attributions—bad	outcomes	happen	to	bad	people	because	they	
deserve	them.	Through	immanent	justice	reasoning,	then,	people	are,	in	retrospect,	making	sense	of	
a	random	bad	outcome	by	locating	its	“cause”	in	the	prior	misdeeds	of	the	unfortunate	victim.	
But	a	concern	for	deservingness	may	also	establish	an	active,	anticipatory	preference	to	see	
deserved	outcomes.	It	is	well-documented	that	during	information	seeking,	people	tend	to	
selectively	expose	themselves	to	information	that	is	consistent	rather	than	inconsistent	with	their	
attitudes,	beliefs,	and	decisions	(for	reviews,	see	Frey,	1986;	Hart,	Albarracín,	Eagly,	Brechan,	
Lindberg,	Lee,	&	Merrill,	2009;	Smith,	Fabrigar,	&	Norris,	2008).	In	a	typical	selective	exposure	
experiment,	participants	are	asked	to	commit	to	an	attitude,	opinion,	or	decision	regarding	an	issue	
and	then	are	given	the	opportunity	to	receive	additional	information	concerning	the	issue.	The	
additional	information	is	usually	presented	as	a	list	of	short	statements,	commentaries,	or	abstracts	
summarizing	opposing	perspectives	on	the	issue	(ostensibly	from	previous	participants,	experts,	
news	articles,	etc.).	For	example,	Jonas,	Schulz-Hardt,	Frey,	and	Thelan	(2001)	found	that	
participants	tended	to	choose	additional	information	that	supported	rather	than	conflicted	with	
their	initial	“policy”	decision	concerning	whether	the	government	should	fund	alternative	healing	
methods	or	only	traditional	medicine.	This	tendency	for	people	to	seek	out	confirmatory	information	
has	been	found	in	a	variety	of	domains,	including	social	stereotypes	(e.g.,	Johnston,	1996),	smoking	
activity	(e.g.,	Canon	&	Matthews,	1972),	investment	decisions	(Jonas	&	Frey,	2003),	attitudes	
towards	toilet	training	(Maccoby,	Maccoby,	Romney	&	Adams,	1961),	attitudes	toward	capital	
punishment	(Smith,	Fabrigar,	Powell,	&	Estrada,	2007),	and	religious	beliefs	(McFarland	&	Warren,	
1992).		
Based	only	on	the	knowledge	of	another	person’s	moral	character	or	conduct,	observers	
may	be	similarly	biased	toward	receiving	outcome	information	that	is	consistent	with	what	that	
person	deserves.	For	example,	people	might	prefer	to	learn	that	a	serial	rapist	was	crippled	in	a	car	
crash	more	than	learning	that	he	won	a	lottery,	and	they	might	go	to	some	lengths	to	do	so,	
Selective	Exposure								5
presumably	because	rapists	are	more	deserving	of	being	injured	than	they	are	of	winning	lotteries.	
Likewise,	people	might	prefer	to	learn	that	a	charity	worker	won	a	lottery	more	than	learning	that	he	
was	crippled	in	a	car	crash,	again	because	of	their	concerns	about	deservingness.	Such	selective	
exposure	to	bad	(good)	outcomes	for	bad	(good)	people	points	to	a	more	proactive,	anticipatory	
route	for	people	to	maintain	a	sense	of	justice	and	deservingness	than	has	been	previously	
recognized.	Specifically,	selective	exposure	to	deserved	outcomes	might	help	people	navigate	
through	the	world	in	a	way	that	sustains	the	assumption	that	it	is	a	just	and	fair	place	where	people	
get	what	they	deserve.	Indeed,	if	people	selectively	choose	to	learn	about	deserved	rather	than	
undeserved	outcomes,	then	they	can	shield	themselves	from	the	potentially	unsettling	prospect	that	
the	world	is	not	so	fair,	just,	and	non-random	after	all.	
Based	on	dissonance	theory	(Festinger,	1957),	the	main	explanation	for	selective	exposure	
to	congenial	information	is	defense	motivation,	or	the	desire	to	defend	one’s	beliefs,	attitudes,	or	
decisions	(see	Hart	et	al.,	2009).	According	to	this	account,	people	selectively	expose	themselves	to	
information	congenial	to	their	prior	attitudes	and	decisions	to	reduce	or	avoid	the	potential	concern	
associated	with	the	possibility	that	they	might	be	wrong.	In	their	meta-analysis,	Hart	et	al.	(2009)	
found	that	the	effects	of	selective	exposure	to	confirmatory	information	increased	as	a	function	of	
factors	that	increase	defense	motivation,	such	as	making	decisions	under	high	(vs.	low)	choice,	
dedicating	time	and	effort	to	make	a	decision,	justifying	decisions	to	others,	and	reporting	high	
commitment	to	a	belief	or	decision.	What	we	are	proposing	here—that	people	selectively	expose	
themselves	to	deserved	outcomes—is	similar	insofar	as	people	are	motivated	to	defend	the	belief	
that	people	get	what	they	deserve	(Lerner,	1980).	Indeed,	believing	in	a	just	world	might	be	
important	enough	to	people	that	simply	passively	receiving	information	about	another	person’s	
moral	character	or	conduct	may	be	sufficient	to	instigate	an	active	search	for	deserved	outcomes	
when	there	is	an	opportunity	to	do	so.	
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Building	on	procedures	and	measures	from	the	selective	exposure	literature,	we	tested	the	
general	hypothesis	that	people	will	selectively	choose	to	learn	that	bad	(good)	things	happened	to	
bad	(good)	people.	The	results	of	a	recent	eye-tracking	study	lend	weight	to	this	hypothesis:	Callan,	
Ferguson,	and	Bindemann	(2013)	found	that	the	good	or	bad	moral	conduct	of	characters	portrayed	
within	audio-visual	scenes	biased	participants’	anticipatory	gaze	preferences	to	images	of	good	or	
bad	outcomes	just	before	the	actual	outcomes	were	revealed.	These	results	suggest	that	people	
expect,	via	their	eye-movements,	bad	(good)	things	to	happen	to	bad	(good)	people.	But	whether	
people	selectively	choose	to	learn	about,	and	will	consciously	and	actively	search	for,	outcomes	that	
are	evaluatively	consistent	with	the	moral	character	or	conduct	of	others	has	yet	to	be	examined.	
Specifically,	although	implied	in	their	work,	Callan	et	al.	did	not	directly	show	that	people’s	eye-gaze	
preferences	for	good	(bad)	outcomes	occurring	to	good	(bad)	people	were	specifically	due	to	their	
concerns	about	deservingness,	nor	did	their	eye-tracking	approach	allow	them	test	predictions	
about	whether	people	might	incur	some	cost	to	selectively	choose	to	receive	additional	information	
about	deserved	outcomes.		We	therefore	extended	previous	research	by	examining	(a)	the	actual	
choices	people	make	when	faced	with	the	knowledge	that	someone	is	morally	good	or	bad;	(b)	
whether	people	might	incur	some	cost,	by	way	of	their	time,	to	receive	deservingness-congruent	
outcome	information	(Studies	4	to	6;	cf.	Frey,	1981);	and,	importantly,	(c)	whether	these	selective	
exposure	effects	occur	because	of	people’s	concerns	about	deservingness	(Studies	2,	3,	and	7).	
Sampling	
Across	studies	the	minimum	required	sample	sizes	were	fixed	ahead	of	data	collection;	
however,	the	final	sample	sizes	were	not	completely	predetermined	due	to	the	removal	of	some	
participants	(e.g.,	for	failing	story	comprehension	check	questions;	see	below).	Power	analyses	
showed	that	our	samples	had	at	least	80%	power	(usually	much	higher)	to	detect	“medium”	effect	
sizes	(e.g.,	dz	=	.50	for	within-subjects	contrasts;	two-tailed,	α	=	.05).	We	report	all	measures,	
manipulations,	and	exclusions	in	these	studies.	
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STUDY	1	
In	Study	1,	we	presented	participants	with	a	series	of	short	narratives	describing	different	
people	engaging	in	either	morally	good	or	bad	behavior.	We	then	asked	participants	to	rate	the	
extent	to	which	they	wanted	to	learn	about	different	possible	good	and	bad	outcomes	occurring	to	
the	target	individuals.	On	the	basis	of	the	foregoing	analysis,	we	predicted	that	participants	would	
want	to	read	more	about	the	deservingness-congruent	outcomes	than	the	deservingness-
incongruent	outcomes.	
Method	
Participants	
Participants	from	the	United	States	were	recruited	through	Amazon’s	Mechanical	Turk	(N	=	
48;	54.2%	females;	Mage	=	36.52;	SDage	=	12.80).		
Materials	and	procedure	
We	told	participants	the	study	was	about	“investigating	the	processing	of	narrative	
information”	and	that	they	would	rate	(cf.	Brannon,	Tagler,	&	Eagly,	2007;	Lowin,	1969)	the	extent	to	
which	they	wanted	to	read	different	possible	conclusions	to	a	number	of	short	stories.		
Adapted	from	Callan	et	al.	(2013),	and	employing	a	fully	within-subjects	design,	we	
presented	participants	with	4	short	stories	(see	online	supplemental	materials	for	all	of	the	scenarios	
and	items	we	used	across	studies):	2	describing	a	good	person	(e.g.,	Jenny	saved	a	drowning	puppy)	
and	2	describing	a	bad	person	(e.g.,	Sally	stole	from	a	charity	collection	box).	For	example,	for	one	of	
the	stories	participants	read:	
A	week	ago,	Jenny	was	walking	along	the	River	Wye	when	she	spotted	a	puppy	drowning	in	
the	river.	Risking	her	own	life,	Jenny	dived	into	the	river	and	saved	the	puppy	from	drowning.	
	
Following	each	story,	participants	read	two	sentences	representing	additional	pieces	of	
information	about	the	target	individuals.	One	sentence	represented	a	good	outcome	(e.g.,	“One	
week	later,	Jenny	was	sitting	in	her	living	room	when	she	received	news	that	she	had	won	a	new	car	
in	a	sweepstake	she	had	entered”)	and	the	other	represented	a	bad	outcome	(e.g.,	“One	week	later,	
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Jenny	was	sitting	in	her	living	room	when	she	received	news	that	her	husband	was	in	a	terrible	car	
accident”).1	Participants	were	asked	to	rate	the	extent	to	which	they	wanted	to	read	these	endings	
to	the	stories	(1	=	I	do	not	want	to	read	these	details	later	on	in	the	survey	to	7	=	I	want	to	read	these	
details	later	on	in	the	survey),	ostensibly	because	their	ratings	would	determine	the	conclusions	to	
the	stories	that	they	would	actually	read	and	evaluate.	The	stories	were	presented	to	participants	in	
a	fully	counter-balanced	random	order.		
Results	and	Discussion	
Participants’	ratings	of	wanting	the	outcome	information	were	submitted	to	a	linear	mixed	
effects	model	using	the	lme4	package	(Bates,	Maechler,	Bolker,	&	Walker,	2015,	version	1.1-10)	in	R	
(R	Core	Team,	2015,	version	3.2.0).	This	form	of	regression	allows	us	to	model	each	participant’s	8	
separate	responses	as	a	function	of	fixed	and	random	effects,	rather	than	requiring	us	to	average	
the	two	examples	of	good/bad	people	to	form	a	single	observation	per	cell	of	the	design,	as	in	
traditional	ANOVA.	The	model	included	fixed	effects	for	Person	(good	vs.	bad,	coded	+1	and	-1),	
Outcome	ratings	(good	vs.	bad,	coded	+1	and	-1)	and	the	Person	X	Outcome	interaction.	We	
included	random	intercepts	for	participants	and	scenarios,	and	random	slopes	by	participants	for	the	
effects	of	Person,	Outcome,	and	Person	X	Outcome	and	by	scenarios	for	the	effect	of	Outcome.	That	
is,	we	allowed	both	main	effects	and	the	interaction	to	vary	across	participants,	and	allowed	the	
effects	of	Outcome	to	vary	across	scenarios.	Note	that,	because	each	scenario	is	only	ever	associated	
with	one	type	of	person,	we	did	not	include	by-scenario	random	slopes	for	Person	or	the	interaction.	
Random	effects	were	uncorrelated	(Barr,	Levy,	Scheepers,	&	Tily,	2013);	including	the	correlation	
terms	led	to	overfitting	and	a	failure	to	converge.	We	used	Satterthwaite	approximations	to	
calculate	p-values	using	the	lmerTest	package	(Kuznetsova,	Brockhoff	&	Christensen,	2015).	Analyses	
revealed	a	significant	Person	X	Outcome	interaction,	b	=	0.52;	95%	CI	of	0.31,	0.73;	t	=	4.77,	p	<	.001	
(see	Figure	1).	Neither	main	effect	achieved	statistical	significance	(both	ps	>	.25).	Analysing	the	data	
                                                
1	In	a	separate	validation	study	(N	=	49),	we	found	that	for	each	of	the	scenarios	we	used	in	Study	1,	the	good	
(bad)	target	characters	were	perceived	as	more	deserving	of	the	good	(bad)	outcomes	(all	ps	<	.001,	dzs	>	.68).	
Details	and	full	statistical	reporting	of	this	validation	study	are	presented	in	the	supplementary	materials.	
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with	a	conventional	2x2	ANOVA	after	taking	the	mean	of	the	two	scenarios	for	a	given	Person	type	
yielded	exactly	the	same	conclusions.	
	
Figure	1.	The	extent	to	which	participants	wanted	to	read	outcome	information	as	function	of	the	
value	of	the	targets’	moral	value	and	the	value	of	the	outcome	information	(Study	1).	Error	bars	
show	95%	CIs	of	the	means.	
	
Follow-up	analyses	revealed	that	participants	wanted	to	read	the	good	outcome	information	
more	than	the	bad	outcome	information	after	first	reading	about	a	good	person,	B	=	0.513;	95%	CI	
of	0.305,	0.757;	t	=	6.18,	p	<	.001	(r	between	dependent	measures	=	-.09).	When	reading	about	a	bad	
person,	participants	wanted	to	read	the	bad	outcome	information	more	than	the	good	outcome	
information,	B	=	-0.503;	95%	CI	of	-0.742,	-0.263;	t	=	-5.75,	p	<	.001	(r	between	dependent	measures	
=	.01).	Therefore,	participants	wanted	to	read	conclusions	to	the	narratives	that	were	consistent	
with	what	the	targets’	deserved—bad	(good)	things	happen	to	bad	(good)	people.	
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STUDY	2	
The	purpose	of	Study	2	was	two-fold:	(a)	to	replicate	our	Study	1	findings	using	a	between-	
rather	than	within-subjects	design	(with	the	former	being	less	susceptible	to	carry-	over	or	
participant	expectation	effects),	and	(b)	to	examine	the	mediating	role	that	perceived	deservingness	
plays	in	the	effects	of	a	target	person’s	moral	value	on	participants’	selective	exposure	to	good	and	
bad	outcome	information.		
Method	
Participants	
Participants	from	the	U.S.A.	were	recruited	online	through	MTurk	(N	=	138;	31.2%	females;	
Mage	=	30.45;	SDage	=	10.07).	To	ensure	independence	of	the	data,	two	additional	participants	were	
not	included	in	analyses	because	of	duplicate	IP	addresses	(we	retained	the	data	for	only	the	first	
occurrence	of	each	duplicate	IP).		
Materials	and	procedure	
Study	2	was	similar	to	Study	1	but	we	adopted	a	between-subjects	design	such	that	each	
participant	only	read	and	responded	to	one	short	story.	Participants	first	read	about	a	man,	named	
Geoff,	who	either	threw	a	puppy	in	a	river	(bad	person)	or	saved	a	puppy	from	drowning	in	a	river	
(good	person):	
(good	person)	A	week	ago,	Geoff	was	walking	along	the	River	Wye	when	he	spotted	a	puppy	
drowning	in	the	river.	Risking	his	own	life,	Geoff	dived	into	the	river	and	saved	the	puppy	from	
drowning.	
	
(bad	person)	A	week	ago,	Geoff	was	walking	along	the	River	Wye	when	he	spotted	a	puppy	
along	the	bank	of	the	river.	With	no	regard	for	its	life,	Geoff	picked	up	the	puppy	and	threw	it	
in	the	river.	
	
	Participants	were	then	asked	to	answer	questions	about	“the	possible	conclusions	to	this	
narrative”.	Participants	first	rated	the	degree	to	which	they	believed	Geoff	deserved	to	experience	
each	of	two	outcomes:	“To	what	extent	do	you	believe	Geoff	deserves	to	win	a	new	car	in	a	
sweepstake	he	enters?”	and	“To	what	extent	do	you	believe	that	Geoff	deserves	to	be	in	a	terrible	
car	accident	that	leaves	him	in	hospital	in	a	serious	condition?”	(1	=	Not	at	all	deserving	to	7	=	Very	
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deserving).	Next,	mirroring	the	outcomes	for	the	deservingness	ratings,	participants	rated	the	extent	
to	which	they	wanted	to	read	about	Geoff	receiving	two	outcomes:	winning	a	car	in	a	sweepstake	
and	being	in	a	terrible	car	accident	(1	=	I	do	not	want	to	read	these	details	later	on	in	the	survey,	7	=	I	
want	to	read	these	details	later	on	in	the	survey).		
Results	and	Discussion	
Because	there	is	only	one	observation	per	condition	from	each	participant,	and	only	one	
scenario,	we	analysed	the	data	with	a	conventional	ANOVA	rather	than	attempting	to	fit	a	mixed-
effects	model.	A	2	(person:	bad	vs.	good)	by	2	(outcome	information:	bad	vs.	good)	mixed	ANOVA	
with	Person	as	the	between-subjects	factor	revealed	a	significant	interaction	for	participants’	
judgments	of	deservingness,	F(1,	135)	=	252.91,	p	<	.001,	ω2	=	.63	(one	participant	did	not	answer	
the	deservingness	questions).		
	
	
Figure	2.	Perceptions	of	deservingness	(left	panel)	and	ratings	of	wanting	to	read	outcome	
information	(right	panel)	as	function	of	the	value	of	the	targets’	moral	value	and	the	value	of	the	
outcome	information	(Study	2).	Error	bars	show	95%	CIs	of	the	means.	
	
Shown	in	Figure	2	(left	panel),	participants	in	the	good	person	condition	rated	Geoff	as	more	
deserving	of	the	good	outcome	than	the	bad	outcome,	t(69)	=	17.55,	p	<	.001,	dz	=	2.10	(r	between	
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repeated	measures	=	-.034).	Conversely,	participants	in	the	bad	person	condition	rated	Geoff	as	
more	deserving	of	the	bad	outcome	than	the	good	outcome,	t(69)	=	-7.37,	p	<	.001,	dz	=	-0.90	(r	
between	repeated	measures	=	-.306).	There	were	also	significant	main	effects	of	Person	and	
Outcome	Information	(both	ps	<	.01).	
	 There	was	also	a	significant	interaction	for	participants’	ratings	of	how	much	they	wanted	to	
read	the	potential	outcome	information,	F(1,	136)	=	83.01,	p	<	.001,	ω2	=	.37.	Shown	in	Figure	2	
(right	panel),	participants	in	the	good	person	condition	wanted	to	read	the	good	outcome	
information	to	a	greater	extent	than	the	bad	outcome	information,	t(69)	=	6.52,	p	<	.001,	dz	=	0.78	(r	
between	repeated	measures	=	-.344).	Participants	in	the	bad	person	condition	wanted	to	read	the	
bad	outcome	information	more	than	the	good	outcome	information,	t(67)	=	-6.46,	p	<	.001,	dz	=	-
0.78	(r	between	repeated	measures	=	.211).	Neither	main	effect	achieved	statistical	significance	(ps	
>	.37).	
	 To	examine	whether	participants’	perceptions	of	deservingness	mediated	the	effect	of	the	
target’s	moral	worth	on	their	wanting	to	read	good	versus	bad	outcome	information,	we	first	
computed	difference	scores	for	both	participants’	ratings	of	deservingness	and	their	ratings	of	
wanting	of	the	outcome	information;	positive	values	represent	participants’	belief	that	Geoff	
deserved	a	good	outcome	more	than	a	bad	outcome	and	that	they	wanted	to	review	the	good	
outcome	information	more	than	the	bad	outcome	information.	These	difference	scores	were	highly	
correlated,	r	=	.74,	p	<	.001	(pooled	across	conditions),	such	that	the	more	participants	believed	
Geoff	deserved	a	good	(vs.	bad)	outcome,	the	more	they	wanted	to	review	good	(vs.	bad)	outcome	
information	later	in	the	survey.	
Bootstrapped	analyses	(Preacher	&	Hayes,	2008;	10,000	resamples)	revealed	that	perceived	
deservingness	mediated	the	effect	of	the	target’s	moral	worth	(good	=	1	vs.	bad	=	-1)	on	the	relative	
ratings	of	wanting	good	vs.	bad	outcome	information	(indirect	effect	=	1.696,	95%	Bias	Corrected	
and	Accelerated	Confidence	Interval	[BCa	CI]	of	1.147,	2.24;	see	Figure	3).	These	results	suggest	that	
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one	of	the	reasons	why	participants	wanted	to	review	good	(bad)	outcome	information	for	a	good	
(bad)	person	was	because	they	believed	he	deserved	it.	
	
Figure	3.	The	influence	of	the	moral	worth	of	the	target	character	on	selective	exposure	of	the	good	
(vs.	bad)	outcomes	through	perceived	deservingness	of	the	good	(vs.	bad)	outcomes.	Values	show	
unstandardized	regression	coefficients.	*	p	<	.05	
	
STUDY	3	
Studies	1	and	2	found	that	participants	wanted	to	expose	themselves	to	outcome	information	that	
was	evaluatively	congruent	with	what	other	people	deserved.	In	Study	3,	we	aimed	to	replicate	
these	findings	using	a	different	selective	exposure	paradigm.	Specifically,	rather	than	having	
participants	rate	the	extent	to	which	they	wanted	to	receive	good	and	bad	outcome	information,	we	
asked	them	to	choose	among	several	different	good	and	bad	outcomes	to	review	(cf.	Jonas,	et	al.,	
2001).	We	also	explored	the	interplay	between	selective	exposure	and	selective	avoidance	by	asking	
participants	to	separately	choose	the	outcomes	they	wanted	to	read	and	the	outcomes	they	did	not	
want	to	read	(cf.	Frey	&	Wicklund,	1978,	Rhine,	1967).	One	possibility	is	that	rather	than	selectively	
seeking	outcome	information	that	is	congruent	with	what	others	deserve	(e.g.,	that	a	charity	worker	
won	the	lottery),	people	might	selectively	avoid	outcome	information	that	conflicts	with	their	need	
to	see	that	people	get	what	they	deserve	(e.g.,	that	a	charity	worker	was	crippled	in	a	car	crash).	Of	
course,	selective	exposure	and	selective	avoidance	could	be	opposite	sides	of	the	same	coin	insofar	
as	both	enable	people	to	maintain	the	assumption	that	people	get	what	they	deserve.	Like	Study	2,	
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we	also	asked	participants	to	rate	the	extent	to	which	the	target	person	deserved	various	good	and	
bad	outcomes	as	a	potential	mediator	of	selective	exposure	and	selective	avoidance.	
Method	
Participants	
Participants	from	the	U.S.A.	were	recruited	online	through	MTurk	(N	=	137;	46%	females,	
0.7%	unreported;	Mage	=	33.57;	SDage	=	11.68).	Four	additional	participants	were	not	included	in	
analyses	because	of	duplicate	IPs	(n	=	2)	or	failing	a	simple	story	comprehension	check	(“In	the	story	
you	read	at	the	beginning	of	the	survey,	what	did	Chris	do	to	the	puppy?”;		n	=	2).	
Materials	and	procedure	
Like	Study	2,	participants	read	a	story	about	a	person	(the	name	Chris	was	used	in	Study	3)	
who	either	drowned	a	puppy	in	a	river	(bad	person)	or	saved	a	puppy	from	drowning	in	a	river	(good	
person).	After	reading	the	story,	participants	were	asked,	“To	what	extent	do	you	believe	Chris	
deserves	to…”	and	then	saw	a	list	of	8	outcomes	that	they	were	asked	to	rate	on	a	7-point	scale	(1	=	
Not	at	all	deserving	to	7	=	A	great	deal	deserving).	Of	the	8	outcomes,	4	were	bad	outcomes	(α	=	
.98):	“…be	injured	in	a	car	accident”,	“…be	fired	from	his	job”,	“…contract	a	major	illness”	and	“have	
his	apartment	destroyed	by	a	flood”.	The	other	4	outcomes	were	good	outcomes	(α	=	.98):	“…win	
$100,000	playing	a	scratchcard	lottery	ticket”,	“…have	his	stocks	and	shares	skyrocket”,	“…be	given	a	
promotion	at	work”	and	“…win	a	luxury	cruise	trip”.	
Participants	then	saw	a	list	of	8	possible	outcomes	to	the	story	about	Chris,	which	were	
identical	to	the	outcomes	participants	rated	in	terms	of	his	deservingness	(e.g.,	injured	in	a	car	
accident).	We	instructed	participants	to	select	only	2	of	the	outcomes	they	would	“DEFINITELY”	want	
to	read	later	in	the	survey	and	only	2	outcomes	that	they	would	“DEFINITELY	NOT”	want	to	read	
(i.e.,	we	imposed	information	limits,	see	Fischer,	Jonas,	Frey,	&	Schulz-Hardt,	2005).	We	randomized	
the	order	of	the	questions	so	participants	were	either	asked	to	choose	among	the	“definitely	want”	
outcomes	first	or	the	“definitely	not	want”	outcomes	first.		
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Results	and	Discussion	
There	was	a	significant	Person	X	Outcome	Information	interaction	for	participants’	
judgments	of	deservingness,	F(1,	134)	=	306.35,	p	<	.001,	ω2	=	.69.	Participants	in	the	good	person	
condition	rated	Chris	as	more	deserving	of	the	good	outcomes	(M	=	5.08,	SD	=	1.67)	than	the	bad	
outcomes	(M	=	1.27,	SD	=	0.74),	t(68)	=	16.23,	p	<	.001,	dz	=	1.95	(r	between	repeated	measures	=	-
.193).	Participants	in	the	bad	person	condition	rated	Chris	as	more	deserving	of	the	bad	outcomes	
(M	=	4.50,	SD	=	2.31)	than	the	good	outcomes	(M	=	1.33,	SD	=	0.83),	t(67)	=	-9.79,	p	<	.001,	d	=	-1.19	
(r	between	repeated	measures	=	-.28).	Neither	main	effect	achieved	statistical	significance	(ps	>	.11)	
We	analysed	the	number	of	bad	outcomes	participants	wanted	to	read	(which	could	range	
from	0	to	2)	between	the	bad	and	good	person	conditions.	Because	we	fixed	the	total	number	of	
choices	participants	could	make	to	2,	and	there	were	an	even	number	of	good	and	bad	outcome	
options,	the	results	are	identical	using	the	number	of	good	outcomes	participants	chose	as	the	
dependent	variable	(except	for	opposite	sign).	Thus,	we	report	only	the	results	for	the	number	of	
bad	outcome	participants	wanted	to	read	(and,	per	below,	only	the	good	outcome	they	did	not	want	
to	read).		
Participants	in	the	bad	person	condition	chose	to	read	more	bad	outcomes	later	in	the	
survey	(M	=	1.75,	SD	=	0.56)	than	participants	in	the	good	person	condition	(M	=	0.26,	SD	=	0.56),	
t(134.99)	=	15.61,	p	<	.001,	d	=	2.66	(here	and	throughout,	degrees	of	freedom	were	Welch-
corrected	where	necessary).	Participants	in	the	bad	person	condition	also	chose	not	to	receive	more	
good	outcomes	on	average	(M	=	1.59,	SD	=	0.78)	than	participants	in	the	good	person	condition	(M	=	
0.20,	SD	=	0.53),	t(118.16)	=	12.17,	p	<	.001,	d	=	2.08.	The	residual	components	from	these	analyses	
were	not	normally	distributed,	but	non-parametric	tests—specifically,	Mann-Whitney	U	tests	and	
percentile	bootstrap	confidence	intervals	(CI)	of	the	mean	differences	(5,000	samples)—yielded	the	
same	pattern	of	results	for	the	effect	of	the	moral	value	of	the	target	on	the	bad	outcomes	
participants	wanted	to	read,	Z	=	9.36,	p	<	.001,	95%	bootstrap	CI	of	1.30	and	1.66,	and	the	good	
outcomes	participants	did	not	want	to	read,	Z	=		8.42,	p	<	.001,	95%	bootstrap	CI	of	1.16	and	1.60.	
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Participants’	choices	of	the	bad	outcomes	they	wanted	to	read	and	the	good	outcomes	they	did	not	
want	to	read	were	highly	correlated,	r	=	.87,	p	<	.001.	
Following	Study	2,	we	examined	whether	participants’	perceptions	of	deservingness	
mediated	the	effect	of	the	target’s	moral	worth	on	their	choices	to	read	and	not	to	read	good	and	
bad	outcome	information.	We	first	computed	difference	scores	for	participants’	ratings	of	
deservingness	(mean	of	the	deservingness	ratings	for	the	bad	outcomes	minus	the	mean	for	the	
good	outcomes).	These	scores	correlated	highly	with	participants’	choices	to	receive	bad	outcome	
information	and	not	receiving	good	outcome	information	(rs	=	.80	and	.76,	ps	<	.001,	respectively).	
Shown	if	Figure	4,	bootstrapped	analyses	(Preacher	&	Hayes,	2008;	10,000	resamples)	revealed	that	
perceived	deservingness	mediated	the	effect	of	the	target’s	moral	worth	(good	=	1	vs.	bad	=	-1)	on	
wanting	to	receive	bad	outcome	information	(total	effect	=	-0.74;	indirect	effect	=	-0.33,	95%	BCa	CI	
of	-0.485,	-0.175)	and,	in	a	separate	analysis,	not	wanting	to	receive	good	outcome	information	
(total	effect	=	-0.69;	indirect	effect	=	-0.42,	95%	BCa	CI	of	-0.589,	-0.245).	
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Figure	4.	The	influence	of	the	moral	worth	of	the	target	character	on	selective	exposure	to	bad	
outcomes	(top	section)	and	selective	avoidance	of	good	outcomes	(bottom	section)	through	
perceived	deservingness	of	the	good	(vs.	bad)	outcomes.	Values	show	unstandardized	regression	
coefficients.	*	p	<	.05	
	
Study	4	
In	Study	3	we	found	that	participants	selectively	sought	deserved,	and	selectively	avoided	
undeserved,	outcomes.	One	issue	with	our	Study	3	design	is	that	asking	participants	to	provide	both	
the	outcomes	they	wanted	to	read	and	the	outcomes	they	did	not	want	to	read	may	have	
introduced	some	uncertainty	about	which	outcomes	they	would	actually	read	after	they	made	their	
selections.	As	such,	participants	may	have	chosen	to	read	deservingness-congruent	outcomes	not	
because	they	wanted	to	read	them	per	se	but	to	increase	the	probability	that	they	would	not	be	
exposed	to	deservingness-incongruent	outcomes	(or	vice	versa).	In	Study	4,	we	disentangled	
selective	avoidance	and	selective	exposure	by	including	evaluatively-neutral	outcome	options	and	
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asking	participants	to	only	choose	the	outcomes	they	wanted	to	read.	In	this	design,	participants	
demonstrate	selective	exposure	if	they	choose	to	read	congruent	information	more	than	
incongruent	or	neutral	information.	For	example,	Jang	(2014)	found	that	participants	selectively	
chose	to	read	news	articles	that	were	consistent	with	their	political	attitudes	(e.g.,	“10	Reasons	to	be	
Pro-Choice”	for	someone	with	a	positive	attitude	toward	pro-choice)	more	than	news	articles	that	
were	either	inconsistent	with	their	attitudes	(e.g.,	“Abortion	Harmful	to	Mental	Health”)	or	were	
neutral	(e.g.,	“Abortion	Issue	Arises	in	Budget	Debate”).	There	was	also	no	difference	between	
participants’	choices	of	news	articles	that	were	neutral	or	inconsistent	with	their	attitudes.	Thus,	in	
Study	4,	if	participants	are	not	selectively	exposing	themselves	to	deservingness-congruent	
information	then	there	should	be	no	selection	difference	between	deservingness-congruent	and	
neutral	outcomes.	In	other	words,	including	neutral	outcome	information	introduces	a	control	to	
test	whether	participants	are	selectively	exposing	themselves	to	information	that	is	specifically	
deservingness-congruent	and	not	simply	avoiding	deservingness-incongruent	information.		
	 In	Study	4	we	also	did	not	impose	any	limits	on	the	number	of	outcomes	participants	could	
chose	to	read,	including	the	option	to	read	no	outcomes	whatsoever.	Doing	so	effectively	introduced	
a	cost	to	information	seeking	(cf.	Frey,	1981)—choosing	any	outcomes	at	all	would	mean	
participants	would	have	to	forego	some	of	their	free	time	to	further	read	and	evaluate	their	chosen	
outcomes	rather	than	simply	ending	the	survey.	
Method	
Participants	
Participants	were	recruited	online	(N	=	151;	41.1%	females;	Mage	=	34.26;	SDage	=	11.76)	using	
MTurk.	Eleven	additional	participants	were	not	included	in	analyses	because	of	duplicate	IPs	(n	=	7)	
or	failing	a	simple	story	comprehension	check	(n	=	4;	“In	the	story	you	read	at	the	beginning	of	the	
survey,	what	did	Sally	do	at	the	corner	store?”).	
Materials	and	procedure	
Participants	were	invited	to	take	part	in	a	study	“investigating	the	processing	of	narrative	
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information”.	They	first	read	about	Sally,	who	was	buying	bread	and	milk	at	a	corner	store.	Half	of	
the	participants	read	that,	after	paying,	Sally	“stole	all	the	change	from	a	charity	collection	that	was	
on	display	at	the	counter”	(bad	person).	The	other	half	read	that	Sally	“put	all	her	spare	change	into	
the	charity	collection	that	was	on	display	at	the	counter”	(good	person).	
After	reading	the	story,	participants	were	presented	with	a	list	of	9	possible	outcomes	for	
Sally.	Of	the	9	outcomes,	3	were	bad	(“Sally	was	injured	in	a	car	accident”,	“Sally’s	ground-floor	
apartment	was	flooded”,	“Sally	came	down	with	a	serious	illness”),	three	were	good	(“Sally’s	won	
$1,000	playing	a	scratch	card	lottery	ticket”,	“Sally’s	stocks	and	shares	skyrocket”,	“Sally	was	given	a	
major	promotion	at	work”)	and	three	were	neutral	(“Sally	went	to	a	concert”,	“Sally	started	writing	a	
new	blog”,	and	“Sally	tidied	up	her	office”).	Participants	were	told	that	there	were	no	limits	on	the	
number	of	outcomes	they	could	choose	to	read	(“Which	of	these	events,	if	any,	would	you	like	to	
read	more	about	concerning	Sally's	life	soon	after	the	incident	at	the	corner	store?”).		
Results	and	Discussion	
Overall,	a	large	majority	of	participants	(94.7%)	chose	to	receive	at	least	one	of	the	outcome	
information	options	(Mode	=	1,	M	=	2.58,	SD	=	1.95).	Participants’	choices	for	the	outcomes	they	
wanted	to	read	were	subjected	to	2	(Person:	good	vs.	bad)	X	3	(Outcomes:	good	vs.	neutral	vs.	bad)	
mixed	ANOVA	with	repeated	measures	on	the	second	factor.	Analyses	revealed	significant	main	
effects	for	Person,	F(1,	149)	=	12.82,	p	<	.001,	ω2	=	.07,	and	Outcome,	F(1.77,	264.04)	=	12.82,	p	<	
.001,	ω2	=	.07	(Greenhouse-Geisser	corrected).	More	importantly,	analyses	revealed	a	significant	
interaction,	F(1.77,	264.04)	=	23.63,	p	<	.001,	ω2	=	.12	(see	Table	1).	The	residual	components	from	
this	analysis	were	not	normally	distributed.	We	therefore	supplemented	conventional	follow-up	
paired	samples	t-tests	with	non-parametric	tests—specifically,	Wilcoxon	Signed	Ranks	tests	and	
percentile	bootstrap	confidence	intervals	(CI)	of	the	mean	differences	(5,000	samples).	
Follow-up	analyses	revealed	that,	within	the	bad	person	condition,	participants	chose	more	
bad	outcomes	on	average	than	neutral	outcomes,	t(73)	=	4.65,	p	<	.001,	Wilcoxon	Signed	Ranks	test	
Z	=		4.20,	p	<	.001,	95%	bootstrap	CI	of	0.386	and	0.965	(r	between	repeated	measures	=	.06).	There	
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was	no	significant	difference	between	the	neutral	and	good	choices	within	the	bad	person	condition,	
t(73)	=	-0.66,	p	=	.501,	Z	=		-.90,	p	=	.369,	95%	bootstrap	CI	of	-0.206	and	0.107	(r	between	repeated	
measures	=	.60).	Within	the	good	person	condition,	participants	chose	more	good	outcomes	on	
average	than	neutral	outcomes,	t(76)	=	-6.33,	p	<	.001,	Wilcoxon	Signed	Ranks	test	Z	=		5.21,	p	<	
.001,	95%	bootstrap	CI	of	-1.10	and	-0.57	(r	between	repeated	measures	=	.25).	There	was	no	
significant	difference	between	the	neutral	and	bad	choices	within	the	good	person	condition,	t(76)	=	
0.82,	p	=	.415,	Z	=		.92,	p	=	.356,	95%	bootstrap	CI	of	-0.185	and	0.445	(r	between	repeated	measures	
=	-.01).	
Table	1.	The	effect	of	the	moral	value	of	the	target	on	participants’	choices	of	the	outcome	
information	they	wanted	to	read	later	in	the	survey.	
	
	 Value	of	Outcome	
	
Bad	 Neutral	 Good	
Value	of	Person	 	 	 	
Bad		
(n	=	74)	
	
1.11a	(1.05)	 0.43b	(0.74)	 0.49b	(0.80)	
Good	
(n	=	77)	 0.84b	(1.05)	 0.71b	(0.90)	 1.56a	(0.98)	
No	Person	
Information	
(N	=	101)	
0.69a	(0.87)	 0.58a	(0.74)	 1.00	b	(0.82)	
Note.	Values	within	cells	show	means	(standard	deviations)	of	the	number	of	choices.	Means	within	
the	good	and	bad	person	conditions	and	for	the	separate	“no	person	information”	sample	that	do	
not	share	a	common	subscript	across	rows	are	significantly	different	(p	<	.05).	
	
What	outcomes	do	people	tend	chose	to	learn	about	when	they	are	not	given	any	
information	about	the	target	character’s	prior	moral	conduct?	To	address	this	question,	we	recruited	
a	separate	sample	of	online	participants	(N	=	101;	n	=	1	additional	participant	removed	for	having	a	
duplicate	IP	address;	55.9%	female;	Mage	=	36.15;	SDage	=	12.00)	and	asked	them	to	choose	among	
the	same	9	outcome	options	for	“Sally”	as	in	the	main	study,	but	we	gave	them	no	information	
about	her	prior	moral	conduct.	Specifically,	they	read:	“Below	you	will	see	several	events	that	
happened	in	the	life	of	a	woman	named	Sally.	All	that	you	know	about	Sally	is	her	name.	Which	
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events	would	you	like	to	read	more	about?”.	Shown	in	the	bottom	section	of	Table	1,	there	was	a	
tendency	for	participants	to	chose	to	read	about	the	good	outcomes	more	than	the	neutral	
outcomes,	t(100)	=	3.81,	p	<	.001,	Wilcoxon	Signed	Ranks	test	Z	=		3.55,	p	<	.001,	95%	bootstrap	CI	of	
0.21	and	0.63,	and	the	good	outcomes	more	than	the	bad	outcomes,	t(100)	=	2.71,	p	=	.008,	
Wilcoxon	Signed	Ranks	test	Z	=		2.50,	p	=	.013,	95%	bootstrap	CI	of	0.079	and	0.525.	There	was	no	
significant	difference	between	participants’	choices	of	bad	versus	neutral	outcomes,	t(100)	=	0.91,	p	
=	.364,	Wilcoxon	Signed	Ranks	test	Z	=		1.04,	p	=	.30,	95%	bootstrap	CI	of	-0.128	and	0.347.	Thus,	
absent	any	information	about	the	target	person’s	prior	moral	conduct,	participants	tended	to	
choose	to	receive	good	outcome	information	more	than	bad	and	neutral	outcome	information.	This	
is	consistent	with	theories	that	suggest	people	are	Pollyanish	(e.g.,	Taylor	&	Brown,	1988)	or	
Panglossian	(Kay	et	al.,	2007)	–	that	is,	generally	biased	towards	perceiving	their	social	environments	
in	a	more	positive	than	negative	light.		More	specifically,	it	is	consistent	with	theoretical	models	that	
cast	selective	exposure	as	a	mood	regulating	process,	in	which	absent	other	motives,	people	prefer	
hedonically	positive	over	negative	information	(Knobloch	&	Zillman,	2002;	Oliver,	2003;	Zillman,	
1988).		Given	the	pattern	of	results	from	our	main	sample	in	Study	4	(top	section	of	Table	1),	this	
tendency	seems	to	shift	when	participants	do	have	knowledge	of	the	target	person’s	moral	conduct:	
even	when	they	had	the	opportunity	to	choose	no	outcome	information	at	all,	participants	
selectively	exposed	themselves	to	bad	(good)	outcomes	for	a	bad	(good)	person.	Given	that	there	
were	no	differences	between	the	choices	of	neutral	and	good	outcomes	when	the	target	person	was	
bad	and	neutral	and	bad	outcomes	when	she	was	good,	these	findings	also	suggest	that	participants	
are	primarily	selectively	seeking	deservingness-congruent	information	rather	than	selectively	
avoiding	deservingness-incongruent	information.		
STUDY	5	
In	Studies	5	and	6	we	examined	whether	participants	might	expend	some	effort	to	receive	
outcome	information	that	is	consistent	with	what	others	deserve.	In	Study	5,	we	made	it	relatively	
easy	or	difficult	for	participants	to	select	the	outcome	information	they	wanted	to	receive.	We	did	so	
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by	having	participants	search	within	visual	arrays	for	shapes	associated	with	good	or	bad	outcomes,	
which	were	either	relatively	easy	or	hard	to	find.	We	predicted	that	because	people	want	to	see	that	
others	get	what	they	deserve,	participants	would	choose	to	read	good	(bad)	outcome	information	
for	good	(bad)	people	even	when	it	was	relatively	more	difficult	to	do	so.	
Method	
Participants	
Participants	from	the	U.S.A.	were	recruited	online	through	MTurk	(N	=	49;	57.10%	female;	
Mage	=	35.94;	SDage	=	9.59).	
Materials	and	procedure	
Using	a	fully	within-subjects	design,	participants	in	Study	5	were	presented	with	the	same	
short	stories	(2	describing	a	good	person	and	2	describing	a	bad	person)	and	choices	of	additional	
good	or	bad	outcome	information	that	we	used	in	Study	1	(see	supplementary	materials).	For	
example,	for	one	story	participants	read:	
Steve	was	riding	on	the	London	Underground	to	St.	James’s	park	to	meet	his	girlfriend	for	a	
pleasant	outdoor	picnic	in	the	park.	While	at	a	stop,	a	frail	old	lady	entered	the	same	carriage	
occupied	by	Steve.	Instead	of	getting	up	and	offering	his	seat,	Steve	scowled	at	the	old	lady	
and	refused	to	give	up	his	seat.	
	
Following	each	story,	participants	were	presented	with	two	sentences	that	represented	two	
pieces	of	additional	information	about	the	story;	one	describing	a	good	outcome	(e.g.,	“Jenny	was	
sitting	in	her	living	room	when	she	received	news	that	she	had	won	a	new	car	in	a	sweepstakes	she	
had	entered”)	and	one	describing	a	bad	outcome	(e.g.,	“Jenny	was	in	a	terrible	car	accident	that	left	
her	in	hospital	in	serious	condition”).	Each	outcome	was	paired	with	a	colored	shape;	we	asked	
participants	to	decide	which	piece	of	information	they	wanted	to	read	later	in	the	survey	by	
searching	for	and	clicking	on	the	shape	associated	with	that	outcome	within	an	array	of	shapes	that	
would	be	shown	on	the	next	page.		
On	the	next	page	participants	performed	a	search	task	where	they	saw	an	array	of	different	
shapes,	including	the	two	target	shapes	they	just	learned	were	associated	with	the	good	and	bad	
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outcome	information	they	could	receive	(see	Figure	5).		
	
	
	
	
Figure	5.		An	example	array	of	shapes	used	in	Study	3.	In	this	example,	the	red	equilateral	triangle	
(center	of	figure)	represented	the	deservingness	congruent	information	and	the	blue	rhombus	
represented	the	deservingness	incongruent	information.	
	
We	told	participants	to	find	and	click	on	the	shape	in	the	array	that	represented	the	
information	they	wanted	to	read	later	in	the	survey.	We	designed	each	array	with	reference	to	
performance	in	visual	search	experiments,	and	the	theories	that	have	been	advanced	to	explain	this	
performance	(e.g.,	Feature	Integration	Theory:	Triesman	&	Gelade,	1980;	Guided	Search:	Wolfe,	
1994).	In	essence,	these	theories	propose	that	it	is	more	difficult	(less	efficient)	to	find	target	items	
that	share	features	with	distractor	items.	Targets	which	are	defined	by	a	single	unique	feature	(e.g.,	
the	blue	item	in	Figure	4)	seem	to	“pop-out”	and	are	found	quickly	regardless	of	the	number	of	
surrounding	items	and	without	having	to	allocate	focused	attention.	Targets	which	are	defined	by	a	
conjunction	of	features	(e.g.,	the	red	equilateral	triangle	in	Figure	4)	take	much	longer	to	find	and	
are	thought	to	involve	a	more	laborious	search	where	attention	is	moved	serially	from	item-to-item.		
In	the	present	study,	the	shape	representing	the	deservingness-congruent	information	(e.g.,	
a	good	outcome	for	a	good	person)	was	always	the	same	color	as	the	distractor	shapes	(e.g.,	the	red	
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equilateral	triangle	in	Figure	5),	and	was	therefore	less	easy	to	find.	The	shape	representing	the	
deservingness-incongruent	information	was	always	a	“pop-out”	target	with	a	different	color	to	all	
the	other	shapes	in	the	array	(e.g.,	the	blue	rhombus	in	Figure	5),	and	would	therefore	be	found	
“preattentively”	with	little	effort.	In	other	words,	we	made	it	more	difficult	for	participants	to	find	
information	that	was	congruent	(vs.	incongruent)	with	what	the	targets	deserved.	We	asked	
whether	participants	would	still	choose	congruent	information	even	when	their	visual	attention	was	
captured	by	the	incongruent	outcome,	making	it	a	much	quicker	option	to	choose.		
Results	
We	used	mixed	effects	logistic	regression	to	analyze	participants’	choices	of	outcomes	
across	the	scenarios.	The	dependent	variable	was	whether	participants	chose	a	Good	outcome	
(coded	1)	or	a	Bad	outcome	(coded	0).	The	predictor	variable	was	Person	(good,	coded	1,	vs.	bad,	
coded	-1).	We	included	random	intercepts	for	participants	and	scenarios,	and	random	slopes	by	
participants	for	the	effect	of	Person	(with	correlated	random	effects).	There	was	an	overall	tendency	
to	favour	Good	outcomes,	Bintercept	=	3.42,	Z	=	3.83,	95%	CI	1.67	and	5.18,	p	<	.001	(cf.	Study	4);	more	
importantly,	participants	were	more	likely	to	choose	a	good	outcome	for	a	good	person	(73%)	than	
for	a	bad	person	(34%),	Bperson	=	4.15,	Z	=	4.71,	95%	CI	of	2.43	and	5.88,	p	<	.001.	
STUDY	6	
Even	when	it	was	relatively	difficult	to	do	so,	participants	in	Study	5	tended	to	search	for	and	
choose	outcomes	consistent	with	what	the	target	persons	deserved.	Our	assumption	in	Study	5	was	
that	participants’	attention	was	initially	drawn	to	the	distractor	shape,	and	that	participants	then	
had	to	disengage	and	avoid	the	temptation	to	choose	this	shape	by	actively	searching	for	the	shape	
associated	with	the	deservingness-congruent	outcome.	A	stronger	test	of	this	assumption	is	to	
examine	differences	in	response	times	during	visual	search	for	each	type	of	shape.	When	a	shape	is	
both	visually	salient	(e.g.,	is	larger	and	a	different	color	than	other	shapes	within	an	array)	and	
associated	with	the	information	that	participants	generally	want	to	view	(i.e.,	the	deservingness-
congruent	information	is	easier	to	find),	responses	should	be	quick.	In	contrast,	when	a	shape	is	not	
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visually	salient	(e.g.,	is	smaller	and	the	same	color	as	other	shapes)	and	is	associated	with	what	
participants	want	to	view	(i.e.,	the	deservingness-congruent	information	is	harder	to	find),	then	
responses	should	be	slower,	assuming	participants	are	engaging	in	a	more	active,	elaborate	search	
for	this	desired	information.		
Method	
Participants	
Participants	from	the	U.S.A.	were	recruited	online	through	MTurk	(N	=	176;	46%	females;	
Mage	=	33.47;	SDage	=	11.15).	Thirty	additional	participants	were	excluded	from	analyses	because	of	
duplicate	IP	addresses	(n	=	6),	failing	a	simple	multiple	choice	story	comprehension	check	(n	=	8),	
skipping	the	search	task	altogether	(n	=	8),	selecting	both	shapes	(n	=	7),	or	having	no	timing	data	
registered	(n	=	1).	
Materials	and	procedure	
We	told	participants	that	they	would	read	one	short	“incomplete”	story	about	an	individual	
going	about	his	daily	life.	Participants	were	then	told	they	would	be	shown	two	shapes,	each	
representing	two	different	outcomes	for	the	protagonist.	Their	task	was	to	find	and	click	on	the	
shape	within	an	array	of	shapes	that	represented	the	outcome	information	they	wanted	to	read.	
All	participants	read	the	same	short	story,	which	described	a	man	named	Geoff	who	threw	a	
puppy	into	a	river	(we	focused	on	a	bad	person	in	Study	6	to	simplify	the	design).	Participants	were	
then	presented	with	two	pieces	of	additional	information,	represented	by	two	separate	sentences.	
One	sentence	described	Geoff	winning	a	new	car	in	a	sweepstake	(good	outcome);	the	other	
sentence	described	Geoff	being	involved	in	a	terrible	car	accident	that	left	him	in	hospital	in	serious	
condition	(bad	outcome).	
Two	shapes	were	used:	a	large	orange	circle	and	a	small	blue	star.	Shown	in	Figure	6,	the	
orange	circle	was	the	largest	item	in	the	display	and	was	defined	by	a	unique	color,	making	it	a	“pop-
out”	target.	The	blue	star	was	smaller	and	the	same	color	as	multiple	distractors,	so	we	predicted	
that	participants	would	be	much	less	efficient	and	slower	at	finding	it.	The	shape	associated	with	
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each	outcome	was	varied	between	subjects	such	that	the	congruent	outcome	was	either	harder	
(blue	star)	or	easier	(orange	circle)	to	find.		
After	the	search	task,	participants	answered	a	story	comprehension	check	item:	“In	the	brief	
story	you	read,	the	man	(Geoff):	(a)	dived	into	the	river	and	saved	the	puppy,	(b)	threw	the	puppy	
into	the	river,	or	(c)	what	story?”.	Next,	they	answered	‘yes’	or	‘no’	to	a	question	about	whether	
they	selected	the	shape	they	initially	wanted	(“During	the	search	task,	did	you	end	up	finding	and	
selecting	the	shape	you	initially	wanted	to	find?”),	and,	if	no,	why	they	did	not	select	the	shape	they	
initially	wanted	to	search	for	(the	options	were	“I	couldn’t	find	it”,	“I	thought	it	probably	wasn’t	
actually	in	the	array	of	shapes”	and	“other,	please	specify”).	
	
Figure	6.	The	array	of	shapes	used	in	Study	4.	The	orange	circle	was	the	easy-to-find	shape	and	the	
blue	star	was	the	hard-to-find	shape.	Participants	were	told	either	that	deservingness-consistent	or	
inconsistent	information	was	associated	with	one	of	these	shapes.	
	
Results	and	Discussion	
A	greater	proportion	of	participants	chose	the	deservingness	congruent	outcome	(72%)	than	
the	incongruent	outcome,	χ2	contingency	test	=	32.82,	p	<	.001.	This	tendency,	however,	differed	as	
a	function	of	how	easy	or	hard	it	was	to	find	the	congruent	outcome,	χ2	contingency	test	=	26.11,	p	<	
.001,	such	that	a	larger	proportion	of	participants	chose	the	shape	associated	with	the	congruent	
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outcome	when	it	was	easier	to	find	(89%)	than	when	it	was	harder	to	find	(54%).	More	importantly,	
analysis	of	participants’	log-transformed	search	times2	revealed	that	participants	took	longer	to	
choose	a	shape	when	the	deservingness-congruent	information	was	harder	(M	=	2.73,	SD	=	1.01)	
than	when	it	was	easier	(M	=	1.70,	SD	=	1.15)	to	find,	t(171.92)	=	6.29,	p	<	.001,	d	=	.95.		
Ancillary	sub-group	analyses	showed	that	participants	who	chose	the	circle	(the	easier-to-
find	option)	took	longer	to	do	so	when	it	was	associated	with	the	incongruent	(good)	outcome	(n	=	
40;	M	=	2.23,	SD	=	1.16)	than	with	the	congruent	(bad)	outcome	(n	=	79;	M	=	1.50,	SD	=	1.04),	
t(71.03)	=	3.39,	p	=	.001,	d	=	.66.	There	were	no	significant	differences	in	search	times	among	
participants	who	chose	the	star	(the	harder-to-find	option)	when	it	was	associated	with	the	
incongruent	outcome	(n	=	10;	M	=	3.25,	SD	=	0.82)	versus	the	congruent	outcome	(n	=	47;	M	=	3.14,	
SD	=	0.62),	t(11.27)	=	-0.40,	p	=	.70,	d	=	-0.15.	The	difference	of	these	differences	was	significant,	F(1,	
172)	=	4.86,	p	=	.029.	Further,	20	participants	reported	not	ultimately	choosing	the	shape	they	
wanted	to	choose,	and	all	of	these	participants	chose	the	easier-to-find	circle	(80%	reported	they	
could	not	find	the	blue	star;	20%	thought	it	actually	wasn’t	in	the	array).	Among	participants	who	
chose	the	circle,	a	significantly	greater	proportion	reported	selecting	the	shape	they	did	not	want	to	
select	when	the	circle	was	associated	with	the	incongruent	outcome	(14/40,	35%)	than	when	it	was	
associated	with	the	congruent	outcome	(6/79,	8%)	χ2	=	14.26,	p	<	.001.	These	results	suggests	that	
even	though	many	participants	ultimately	chose	the	easier-to-find	option	when	it	was	associated	
with	the	deservingness-incongruent	outcome,	they	were	actively	searching	for	the	deservingness-
congruent	outcome,	because	they	took	longer	to	make	their	choice	instead	of	immediately	selecting	
the	easy-to-find	shape.	
Study	7	
We	proposed	that	a	concern	for	deservingness	is	one	of	the	reasons	why	people	might	
selectively	expose	themselves	to	bad	(good)	things	happening	to	bad	(good)	people,	and	the	indirect	
                                                
2	For	purpose	of	analysis,	search	time	was	log-transformed	to	help	symmetrize	the	data.	The	results	are	similar	
using	raw	search	times	(Ms	=	22.87	vs.	10.74	seconds),	t(161.84)	=	4.36,	p	<	.001,	d	=	.66.		
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effects	of	perceived	deservingness	we	found	in	Studies	2	and	3	suggest	that	this	is	the	case.	
However,	one	issue	with	these	mediation	findings	is	that	perceived	deservingness	was	measured	
rather	than	manipulated,	so	its	causal	influence	is	unclear	(i.e.,	deservingness	might	be	a	justification	
for,	rather	than	a	cause	of,	selective	exposure	to	good	and	bad	outcomes).	Study	7,	then,	was	
designed	to	provide	further	evidence	for	the	idea	that	a	concern	for	deservingness	underlies	
selective	exposure	to	outcomes.	We	did	so	by	adopting	a	moderation-of-process	design	(Spencer,	
Zanna,	&	Fong,	2005).	Specifically,	drawing	on	research	showing	that	“affirmations	of	justice”	can	
reduce	people’s	tendencies	to	engage	in	strategies	to	maintain	a	commitment	to	deservingness	(e.g.,	
immanent	justice	reasoning;	see	Callan	et	al.,	2014),	participants	in	Study	7	learned	about	bad	
people	who	did	or	did	not	receive	“just	deserts”	for	their	transgressions	before	we	asked	them	to	
rate	how	much	they	wanted	to	receive	good	and	bad	outcome	information.	If	a	concern	for	
deservingness	underlies	these	selective	exposure	effects,	then	learning	that	a	bad	person	already	
got	what	they	deserved—that	is,	received	their	“just	deserts”—should	reduce	the	necessity	for	
participants	to	selectively	expose	themselves	to	bad	outcome	information.	
Method	
Participants	
Participants	from	the	U.S.A.	were	recruited	online	through	Amazon’s	Mechanical	Turk	(N	=	
77;	45%	female;	Mage	=	35.98;	SDage	=	12.60).	Data	from	6	additional	participants	were	not	included	in	
analyses	because	they	either	incorrectly	answered	a	simple,	multiple-choice	story	comprehension	
question	(n	=	5;	“In	the	story	you	read	about	Sally,	what	did	she	do	at	the	corner	store?”)	or	did	not	
answer	all	of	the	items	(n	=	1).	
Materials	and	procedure	
We	informed	participants	that	they	would	read	short	and	incomplete	narratives,	before	
being	asked	to	rate	how	much	they	wanted	to	read	different	pieces	of	additional	information	about	
the	stories.	We	informed	participants	this	additional	information	would	be	shown	to	them	in	full	at	
the	end	of	the	survey.		
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We	used	two	stories,	each	describing	a	bad	person	(Sally	stole	from	a	charity	collection	and	
Steve	was	mean	to	an	elderly	person).	Participants	read	and	responded	to	each	of	the	stories,	but	
one	of	the	stories	ended	with	the	target—Sally	or	Steve—receiving	just	deserts	for	his/her	
transgression.	For	the	Sally	story,	half	the	participants	learned	that	“on	her	way	out	of	the	store,	
Sally	was	approached	by	a	man	who	mugged	and	assaulted	her,	smashing	her	face	to	the	ground	and	
stealing	her	purse	containing	her	cell	phone	and	other	valuable	possessions.”	For	the	story	about	
Steve,	half	the	participants	read	that	he	was	“crossing	the	street	after	leaving	the	subway	when	he	
was	struck	by	a	taxi	running	a	red	light.	Steve	survived	the	incident	but	lost	the	use	of	his	legs.”	Thus,	
participants	read	two	stories,	each	describing	a	“bad”	person,	one	of	which	concluded	with	a	
deservingness	affirmation.	Whether	participants	learned	that	Sally	or	Steve	received	just	deserts	was	
determined	randomly	between	participants	and	the	two	stories	were	presented	to	participants	in	a	
random	order.	
Like	Study	1,	participants	were	then	presented	with	two	pieces	of	additional	information	
(each	summarized	in	a	sentence)	that	describe	an	event	occurring	to	Steve/Sally	after	the	incident(s)	
described	in	the	stories.	Participants	were	asked	to	rate	the	degree	to	which	they	wanted	to	read	
about	these	outcomes	later	in	the	survey.	One	sentence	represented	a	good	outcome	(Sally	won	a	
luxury	cruise;	Steve	won	a	lottery)	and	the	other	described	a	bad	outcome	(Sally	contracted	a	serious	
illness;	Steve’s	apartment	was	destroyed	by	flooding).	Participants	rated	the	extent	to	which	they	
wanted	to	read	each	of	the	outcomes	(1	=	I	do	not	want	to	read	these	details	later	on	in	the	survey	to	
6	=	I	want	to	read	these	details	later	on	in	the	survey).		
Results	and	Discussion	
Participants’	ratings	of	how	much	they	wanted	to	read	about	the	outcomes	were	averaged	
across	the	two	scenarios	and	subjected	to	a	2	(Outcome	to	Read:	good	vs.	bad)	X	2	(Justice	
Affirmation:	affirmation	vs.	no	affirmation)	fully	within-subjects	ANOVA.	Analyses	revealed	a	
significant	main	effect	of	Outcome,	F(1,	76)	=	9.98,	p	=	.002,	which	was	significantly	moderated	by	
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Justice	Affirmation,	F(1,	76)	=	7.90,	p	=	.006,	ω2	=	.08	(see	Figure	7).3	Follow-up	analyses	showed	that	
participants	wanted	to	read	about	bad	outcomes	to	a	greater	extent	than	good	outcomes	when	
there	was	no	justice	affirmation,	t(76)	=	3.99,	p	<	.001	(r	between	repeated	measures	=	-0.37).	There	
was,	however,	no	significant	difference	between	ratings	of	wanting	the	good	and	bad	outcomes	
when	justice	was	affirmed,	t(76)	=	1.48,	p	=	.144	(r	between	repeated	measures	=	-0.21).	Linear	
mixed	effects	modelling	produced	the	same	results,	but	suffered	some	problems	with	estimation.	
Thus,	selective	exposure	to	deserved	outcomes	is	reduced	when	deservingness	is	otherwise	
affirmed,	lending	further	weight	to	the	idea	that	the	sorts	of	effects	we	have	examined	are	due	to	
people’s	concerns	about	seeing	that	people	get	what	they	deserve.		
	
Figure	7.	The	effect	of	justice	affirmation	on	the	extent	to	which	participants	wanted	to	read	good	
and	bad	outcome	information	for	bad	people.	Error	bars	show	95%	CIs	of	the	means.	
                                                
3	Adding	a	between-subjects	factor	that	indicated	which	scenario	included	a	justice	affirmation	did	not	reveal	
any	significant	main	or	interaction	effects	of	scenario	(all	ps	>	.29).	
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General	Discussion	
Employing	a	range	of	stimuli	and	tasks,	the	present	studies	provide	consistent	support	for	
the	general	hypothesis	that	people	choose	to	be	exposed	to	information	about	deserved	rather	than	
undeserved	outcomes.	This	effect	was	mediated	by	the	perceived	deservingness	of	outcomes	
(Studies	2	and	3),	and	was	not	evident	when	participants	knew	that	wrongdoers	had	already	
received	just	deserts	for	their	transgressions	(Study	7).	Participants	were	not	simply	selectively	
avoiding	information	about	undeserved	outcomes	but	actively	sought	information	about	just	
outcomes	(Studies	3	and	4).	Participants	invested	effort	in	this	pattern	of	selective	exposure,	seeking	
out	information	about	deserved	(vs.	undeserved)	outcomes	even	when	it	was	more	difficult	to	do	so	
(Studies	5	and	6).	Further,	response	time	data	showed	that	participants	took	longer	to	search	for	
information	about	deserved	outcomes,	and	suggested	that	even	participants	who	chose	to	view	
information	about	undeserved	outcomes	had	first	searched	for	information	about	deserved	
outcomes	(Study	6).		
It	would	seem	functionally	important	for	people	to	take	a	balanced,	utilitarian	approach	to	
seeking	information	about	the	good	and	bad	things	that	can	happen.	This	would	enable	people	both	
to	hope	for	and	work	towards	the	best	while	avoiding	and	preparing	for	the	worst.		People	clearly	
deviate	from	this	accuracy	motivation	in	the	present	studies.	Of	note,	in	Study	4,	participants	sought	
out	positive	rather	than	negative	outcomes	in	the	life	of	a	person	whose	moral	status	they	did	not	
know.		This	positivity	bias	is	consistent	with	theoretical	models	of	selective	exposure	as	a	mood	
regulating	process	that	helps	people	construct	“positive	illusions”	about	the	world	(Oliver,	2003;	
Zillman,	1988;	more	generally,	Taylor	&	Brown,	1988).		Of	more	interest,	however,	is	that	this	
tendency	was	accentuated	when	participants	thought	the	outcomes	happened	to	good	people,	but	
reversed	when	they	thought	they	happened	to	bad	people.		Thus,	the	preference	to	learn	about	
hedonically	positive	outcomes	was	trumped	by	the	desire	to	learn	about	deserved	outcomes:	
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horrific	car	crashes	and	terminal	illnesses	were	more	attractive	than	dazzling	strokes	of	luck	and	
social	triumphs,	so	long	as	they	were	more	deserved.	
The	present	findings	build	upon	the	eye-tracking	findings	of	Callan	et	al.	(2013).	The	
anticipatory	bias	of	participants’	eye-movements	they	found	can	be	interpreted	as	a	preference	to	
see	deserved	rather	than	undeserved	outcomes,	broadly	consistent	with	the	present	results.	
However,	they	can	also	be	interpreted	as	a	preconscious	expectation	that	the	outcome	will	be	just,	
consistent	with	how	such	predictive	eye-movements	are	interpreted	in	the	literature	on	reading	and	
story	comprehension.	Moreover,	Callan	et	al.	were	not	able	to	differentiate	between	people’s	
expectations	of	deserved	outcomes	and	the	deliberate	choices	people	make	to	receive	information	
consistent	with	the	view	that	people	get	what	they	deserve.	The	present	results	therefore	provide	
the	first	unambiguous	evidence	that	participants,	even	at	the	expense	of	their	time,	actively	and	
deliberately	choose	to	encounter	information	consistent	with	what	is	deserved.	
The	present	findings	uncover	a	theoretically	important,	hitherto	unexplored	means	by	which	
people	preserve	the	belief	that	the	world	is	a	just	place	from	disconfirmatory	evidence.	Other	well-
known	strategies	such	as	immanent	justice	reasoning,	ultimate	justice	reasoning,	and	victim	
derogation	have	been	shown	to	play	an	important	role	in	preserving	the	psychological	benefits	of	
just-world	beliefs	(Ellard,	Harvey,	&	Callan,	2016),	including	the	ability	to	delay	gratification	(Callan,	
Harvey,	&	Sutton,	2014;	Callan,	Harvey,	Dawtry,	&	Sutton,	2013).		However,	these	strategies	involve	
processing	of	information	after	it	has	been	encountered,	and	run	into	important	psychological	
constraints.	For	example,	derogating	innocent	victims	of	misfortune	may	run	counter	to	people’s	
moral	standards	(Hafer	&	Bègue,	2005),	and	immanent	justice	reasoning	runs	counter	to	reality	
constraints	because	it	is	incompatible	with	people’s	knowledge	of	how	the	physical	world	operates	
(Callan	et	al.,	2014).		
In	contrast,	selective	exposure	allows	people	to	expose	themselves	to	biased	samples	of	
outcome	information	in	a	manner	that	is	free	from	these	constraints.	In	principle,	even	if	people	
reason	in	an	unbiased	manner,	through	selective	exposure	they	may	draw	the	biased	conclusion	that	
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the	world	is	a	relatively	fair	place	in	which	people	get	what	they	deserve.	Such	selective	exposure	to	
deserved	outcomes	might	have	important	implications	for	how	people	sustain	and	cultivate	beliefs	
about	deservingness	and	communicate	those	beliefs	to	others.	For	example,	we	can	expect	that	if	
people	selectively	expose	themselves	to	deserved	more	than	undeserved	outcomes,	then	they	might	
be	more	likely	remember	events	as	more	just	and	fair	than	a	balanced,	unbiased	assessment	of	the	
objective	circumstances	might	have	indicated	(cf.	Callan	et	al.,	2009).	That	is,	if	people	selectively	
expose	themselves	to	information	that	elaborates	on	deserved	outcomes,	then	the	logical	outcome	
is	that	they	have	an	opportunity	to	rehearse	that	information.	Such	memory	biases	might	have	
further	consequences	for	information	retransmission	(Cappella,	Kim,	&	Albarracín,	2015)—people	
might	communicate	to	others	that	events	were	just	and	fair	precisely	because	they	selectively	chose	
and	remember	them	in	that	way.	Exploring	this	interplay	between	selective	exposure,	memory	
biases,	and	social	communication	remains	an	important	avenue	for	future	research.	
One	limitation	of	the	present	research	is	our	reliance	on	samples	from	Amazon’s	Mechanical	
Turk.	Research	has	highlighted	some	of	the	strengths	of	MTurk	compared	to	traditional	sampling,	
including	MTurk	participants	being	more	demographically	diverse	than	standard	undergraduate	
samples,	the	rapid	and	inexpensive	nature	of	recruitment,	and	the	sometimes	superior	quality	of	
data	(e.g.,	Buhrmester,	Kwang,	&	Gosling,	2011;	Clifford,	Jewell,	&	Waggoner,	2015;	Hauser	&	
Schwarz,	2016).	Although	MTurk	samples	are	more	diverse	than	traditional	samples,	Paolacci	and	
Chandler	(2014)	warned	that	they	are	not	representative	of	the	general	population.	They	also	
highlighted	that	participants	who	frequently	use	MTurk	may	become	familiar	with	commonly	used	
procedures,	materials,	and	measures	and	therefore	their	responses	may	not	be	“organic,”	whereas	
other	workers	might	not	be	fully	attentive	or	respond	honestly.	We	tried	to	limit	these	concerns	by	
using	novel	materials,	screening	participants	for	multiple	responses,	and	removing	participants	who	
were	clearly	not	attending	to	and	reading	the	materials.	Nonetheless,	future	research	should	
consider	replicating	and	extending	our	findings	using	more	representative	and	non-Western	
samples.	
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Conclusions	
Lerner’s	(1980)	just	world	theory	was	impelled	by	a	paradox:	despite	all	the	evidence	to	the	
contrary,	people	appear	to	believe	that	the	world	is	a	just	place.	It	proposed	two	resolutions	of	this	
paradox.	First,	it	portrayed	the	‘just	world’	as	a	fiction	constructed	and	defended	in	the	mind	of	the	
perceiver.	Thus,	when	they	encounter	injustice,	people	derogate	victims	and	find	other	cognitive	
ways	of	preserving	their	faith	in	justice.	Second,	it	framed	the	‘just	world’	as	an	idyllic	blueprint	that	
motivates	people	to	behaviorally	redress	innocent	suffering,	and	so	reduce	the	disparity	between	
their	idyll	and	reality.	The	present	studies	provide	a	complementary	perspective.	They	suggest	that	
the	‘just	world’	does	not	only	exist	in	the	mind	of	the	perceiver,	but	can	also	be	understood	as	a	
handpicked	region	of	the	objective	world.	Within	(vs.	beyond)	its	deliberately	limited	horizons,	
injustice	is	rare	and	justice	commonplace,	such	that	even	an	unbiased	observer	might	find	just-world	
beliefs	to	be	empirically	warranted.	Indeed,	research	informed	by	the	cognitive-ecological	approach	
to	social	cognition	(Fiedler,	2000)	has	shown	that	sampling	from	biased	information	may	lead	
unbiased	observers	to	draw	biased	conclusions	about	the	fairness	of	their	society	(Dawtry,	Sutton,	&	
Sibley,	2015).	The	present	studies	show	that	people	are	prepared	to	invest	time	and	effort	to	
constrain	their	experience	in	this	way.	By	doing	so,	they	may	save	themselves	considerable	effort	
and	discomfort	in	the	longer	run—In	a	world	that	seldom	contains	injustice,	cognitive	and	behavioral	
strategies	to	minimize	injustice	are	seldom	required.		
	
	 	
Selective	Exposure								35
References	
Bal,	M.,	&	van	den	Bos,	K.	(2015).	Putting	the	“I”	and	“Us”	in	justice:	Derogatory	and	benevolent	
reactions	toward	innocent	victims	in	self-focused	and	other-focused	individuals.	Social	Justice	
Research,	28,	274-292.	
Barr,	D.	J.,	Levy,	R.,	Scheepers,	C.,	&	Tily,	H.	J.	(2013).	Random	effects	structure	for	confirmatory	
hypothesis	testing:	Keep	it	maximal.	Journal	of	Memory	and	Language,	68,	255–278.	
Bates,	D.,	Maechler,	M.,	Bolker,	B.,	&	Walker,	S.	(2015).	Fitting	Linear	Mixed-Effects	Models	Using	
lme4.	Journal	of		Statistical	Software,	67(1),	1-48.	
Brannon,	L.	A.,	Tagler,	M.	J.,	&	Eagly,	A.	H.	(2007).	The	moderating	role	of	attitude	strength	in	
selective	exposure	to	information.	Journal	of	Experimental	Social	Psychology,	43,	611–617.		
Buhrmester,	M.,	Kwang,	T.,	&	Gosling,	S.	D.	(2011).	Amazon's	Mechanical	Turk	a	new	source	of	
inexpensive,	yet	high-quality,	data?	Perspectives	on	Psychological	Science,	6,	3-5.	
Callan,	M.	J.,	&	Ellard,	J.	H.	(2010).	Beyond	derogation	and	blame	of	victims:	Just	world	dynamics	in	
everyday	life.	In	D.	R.	Bobocel,	A.	C.	Kay,	M.	P.	Zanna,	&	J.	M.	Olson	(Eds.).	The	psychology	of	
justice	and	legitimacy:	The	Ontario	Symposium	(Vol.	11,	pp.	53	-	77).	New	York:	Psychology	
Press.		
Callan,	M.	J.,	Ferguson,	H.	J.,	&	Bindemann,	M.	(2013).	Eye	movements	to	audiovisual	scenes	reveal	
expectations	of	a	just	world.	Journal	of	Experimental	Psychology:	General,	142,	34-40.	
Callan,	M.	J.,	Harvey,	A.	J.,	&	Sutton,	R.	M.	(2014).	Rejecting	victims	of	misfortune	reduces	delay	
discounting.	Journal	of	Experimental	Social	Psychology,	51,	41-44.	
Callan,	M.	J.,	Harvey,	A.	J.,	Dawtry,	R.	J.,	&	Sutton,	R.	M.	(2013).	Through	the	looking	glass:	Long-term	
goal	focus	increases	immanent	justice	reasoning.	British	Journal	of	Social	Psychology,	52,	377-
385.	
Callan,	M.	J.,	Kay,	A.	C.,	Davidenko,	N.,	&	Ellard,	J.	H.	(2009).	The	effects	of	justice	motivation	on	
memory	for	self-	and	other-relevant	events.	Journal	of	Experimental	Social	Psychology,	45,	
614-623.	
Selective	Exposure								36
Callan,	M.	J.,	Sutton,	R.	M.,	Harvey,	A.	J.,	&	Dawtry,	R.	J.	(2014).	Immanent	justice	reasoning:	Theory,	
research,	and	current	directions.	In	J.	M.	Olson	&	M.	P.	Zanna	(Eds.),	Advances	in	Experimental	
Social	Psychology	(Vol.	49,	pp.	105	-	161).	London:	Academic	Press.	
Cappella,	J.	N.,	Kim,	H.	S.,	&	Albarracín,	D.	(2015).	Selection	and	transmission	processes	for	
information	in	the	emerging	media	environment:	Psychological	motives	and	message	
characteristics.	Media	Psychology,	18,	396-424.	
Canon,	L.	K.,	&	Matthews,	K.	E.	(1972).	Concern	over	personal	health	and	smoking-relevant	beliefs	
and	behavior.	Proceedings	of	the	Annual	Convention	of	the	American	Psychological	
Association,	7,	271–272.	
Clifford,	S.,	Jewell,	R.	M.,	&	Waggoner,	P.	D.	(2015).	Are	samples	drawn	from	Mechanical	Turk	valid	
for	research	on	political	ideology?	Research	and	Politics,	2,	1-9.	
Dawtry,	R.	J.,	Sutton,	R.	M.,	&	Sibley,	C.	G.	(2015).	Why	wealthier	people	think	people	are	wealthier,	
and	why	it	matters:	From	social	sampling	to	attitudes	to	redistribution.	Psychological	
Science,	26(9),	1389-1400.	
Ellard,	J.	H.,	Harvey,	A.	J.,	&	Callan,	M.	J.	(2016).	The	justice	motive:	History,	theory,	and	research.	In	
C.	Sabbagh	&	M.	Schmitt	(Eds.),	Handbook	of	Social	Justice	Theory	and	Research	(pp.	127-143).	
New	York:	Springer.	
Festinger,	L.	(1957).	A	theory	of	cognitive	dissonance.	Stanford,	CCA:	Stanford	University	Press.	
Fiedler,	K.	(2000).	Beware	of	samples!	A	cognitive-ecological	sampling	approach	to	judgment	
biases.	Psychological	Review,	107,	659–676.	
Fischer,	P.,	Jonas,	E.,	Frey,	D.,	&	Schulz-Hardt,	S.	(2005).	Selective	exposure	to	information:	The	
impact	of	information	limits.	European	Journal	of	Social	Psychology,	35,	469–492.	
Frey,	D.	(1986).	Recent	research	on	selective	exposure	to	information.	In	L.	Berkowitz	(Ed.),	Advances	
in	experimental	social	psychology	(Vol.	19,	pp.	41–80).	New	York:	Academic	Press.	
Frey,	D.,	&	Wicklund,	R.	(1978).	A	clarification	of	selective	exposure:	The	impact	of	choice.	Journal	of	
Experimental	Social	Psychology,	14,	132–139.	
Selective	Exposure								37
Hafer,	C.	L.	(2011).	The	psychology	of	deservingness	and	acceptance	of	human	rights.	In	E.	Kals	&	J.	
Maes	(Eds.),	Justice	and	conflicts:	Theoretical	and	empirical	contributions	(pp.	407–427).	
Hafer,	C.	L.,	&	Bègue,	L.	(2005).	Experimental	research	on	just	world	theory:	Problems,	
developments,	and	future	challenges.	Psychological	Bulletin,	131,	128–166.	
Hafer,	C.	L.,	&	Gosse,	L.	(2011).	Predicting	alternative	strategies	for	preserving	a	belief	in	a	just	
world:	The	case	of	repressive	coping	style.	European	Journal	of	Social	Psychology,	41,	730–
739.	
Hart,	W.,	Albarracín,	D.,	Eagly,	A.	H.,	Brechan,	I.,	Lindberg,	M.,	Lee,	K.,	&	Merrill,	L.	(2009).	Feeling	
validated	versus	being	correct:	A	meta-analysis	of	selective	exposure	to	information.	
Psychological	Bulletin,	135,	555–588.	
Harvey,	A.	J.,	&	Callan,	M.	J.	(2014).	Getting	"just	deserts"	or	seeing	the	"silver	lining":	The	relation	
between	judgments	of	immanent	and	ultimate	justice.	PLoS	ONE,	9,	e101803.	
Harvey,	A.	J.,	Callan,	M.	J.,	&	Matthews,	W.	J.	(2014).	How	much	does	effortful	thinking	underlie	
observers’	reactions	to	victimization?	Social	Justice	Research,	27,	175-208.	
Hauser,	D.	J.,	&	Schwarz,	N.	(2016).	Attentive	Turkers:	MTurk	participants	perform	better	on	online	
attention	checks	than	do	subject	pool	participants.	Behavior	Research	Methods,	48(1),	400–
407.	
Kuznetsova,	K.,	Brockhoff,	P.	B.,		&	Christensen,	R.	H.	B.	(2016).	lmerTest:	Tests	in	Linear	Mixed	
Effects	Models.	R	package	version	2.0-30.	http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=lmerTest	
Johnston,	L.	(1996).	Resisting	change:	Information-seeking	and	stereotype	change.	European	Journal	
of	Social	Psychology,	26,	799-825.	
Jonas,	E.,	&	Frey,	D.	(2003).	Searching	for	information	about	financial	decisions	in	Euro	versus	DM.	
European	Psychologist,	8,	92-96.	
Jonas,	E.,	Schulz-Hardt,	S.,	Frey,	D.,	&	Thelen,	N.	(2001).	Confirmation	bias	in	sequential	information	
search	after	preliminary	decisions:	An	expansion	of	dissonance	theoretical	research	on	
Selective	Exposure								38
“selective	exposure	to	information.”	Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	80,	557–	
571.	
Kay,	A.	C.,	Jost,	J.	T.,	Mandisodza,	A.	N.,	Sherman,	S.	J.,	Petrocelli,	J.	V.,	&	Johnson,	A.	L.	(2007).	
Panglossian	ideology	in	the	service	of	system	justification:	How	complementary	stereotypes	
help	us	to	rationalize	inequality.	In	M.	P.	Zanna	(Ed.),	Advances	in	experimental	social	
psychology	(Vol.	38,	pp.	305–358).	San	Diego,	CA:	Academic	Press.	
Knobloch,	S.,	&	Zillmann,	D.	(2002).	Mood	management	via	the	digital	jukebox.	Journal	of	
Communication,	52,	351-366.	
Lerner,	M.	J.	(1977).	The	justice	motive.	Some	hypotheses	as	to	its	origins	and	forms.	Journal	of	
Personality,	45,	1–32.	
Lerner,	M.	J.	(1980).	The	belief	in	a	just	world:	A	fundamental	delusion.	New	York:	Plenum	Press.	
Lerner,	M.	J.,	&	Simmons,	C.	H.	(1966).	Observer’s	reaction	to	the	‘‘innocent	victim”:	Compassion	or	
rejection?	Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	4(2),	203–210.	
Lowin,	A.	(1969).	Further	evidence	for	an	approach–avoidance	interpretation	of	selective	exposure.	
Journal	of	Experimental	Social	Psychology,	5,	265–271.	
Maccoby,	E.	E.,	Maccoby,	N.,	Romney,	A.	K.,	&	Adams,	J.	S.	(1961).	Social	reinforcement	in	attitude	
change.	Journal	of	Abnormal	and	Social	Psychology,	63,	109–115.	
McFarland,	S.	G.,	&	Warren,	J.	C.	(1992).	Religious	orientations	and	selective	exposure	among	
fundamentalist	Christians.	Journal	for	the	Scientific	Study	of	Religion,	31,	163-244.	
Marsh,	D.	P.,	&	Greenberg,	M.	S.	(2006).	The	influence	of	eyewitness	similarity	to	a	crime	victim	and	
culpability	on	witness’	recall.	Applied	Psychology	in	Criminal	Justice,	2,	43–56.	
Oliver,	M.	B.	(2003).	Mood	management	and	selective	exposure.	In	J.	Bryant,	D.	Roskos-Ewoldsen,	&	
J.	Cantor	(eds.),	Communication	and	emotion:	Essays	in	honor	of	Dolf	Zillmann	(pp.	85–106).	
Mahwah,	NJ:	Lawrence	Erlbaum	Associates.	
Paolacci,	G.,	&	Chandler,	J.	(2014).	Inside	the	Turk:	Understanding	Mechanical	Turk	as	a	participant	
pool.	Current	Directions	in	Psychological	Science,	23,	184–188.	
Selective	Exposure								39
Preacher,	K.	J.,	&	Hayes,	A.	F.	(2008).	Asymptotic	and	resampling	strategies	for	assessing	and	
comparing	indirect	effects	in	multiple	mediator	models.	Behavior	Research	Methods,	40,	879–
891.	
Rhine,	R.	J.	(1967).	The	1964	presidential	election	and	curves	of	information	seeking	and	avoiding.	
Journal	of	Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	5,	416–423.	
Sabbagh,	C.,	&	Schmitt,	M.	(Eds.).	(2016).	Handbook	of	social	justice	theory	and	research.	New	
York:	Springer.	
Smith,	S.	M.,	Fabrigar,	L.	R.,	&	Norris,	M.	E.	(2008).	Reflecting	on	six	decades	of	selective	exposure	
research:	Progress,	challenges,	and	opportunities.	Social	and	Personality	Psychology	Compass,	
2,	464–493.	
Spencer,	S.	J.,	Zanna,	M.	P.,	&	Fong,	G.	T.	(2005).	Establishing	a	causal	chain:	Why	experiments	are	
often	more	effective	in	examining	psychological	process	than	meditational	analyses.	Journal	of	
Personality	and	Social	Psychology,	89,	845–851.	
Smith,	S.	M.,	Fabrigar,	L.	R.,	Powell,	D.	M.,	&	Estrada,	M.	(2007).	The	role	of	information	processing	
capacity	and	goals	in	attitude-congruent	selective	exposure	effects.	Personality	and	Social	
Psychology	Bulletin,	33,	948–960.	
Taylor,	S.	E.,	&	Brown,	J.	(1988).	Illusion	and	well-being:	A	social	psychological	perspective	on	mental	
health.	Psychological	Bulletin,	103,	193-210.	
Treisman,	A.,	&	Gelade,	G.	(1980).	A	feature	integration	theory	of	attention.	Cognitive	Psychology,	
12,	97-136.	
Wolfe,	J.	M.	(1994).	Guided	search	2.0:	A	revised	model	of	visual	search.	Psychonomic	Bulletin	&	
Review,	1,	202	-	238.	
Zillmann,	D.	(1988a).	Mood	management	through	communication	choices.	American	Behavioral	
Scientist,	31,	327–341.	
	 	
Selective	Exposure								40
Supplementary	Materials	
Study	1	
The	four	short	stories	and	the	additional	outcome	information	used	in	Study	1.	Good	outcome	
information	is	numbered	1	and	bad	outcome	information	is	numbered	2.		
Good	person	 Bad	person	
Last	Summer,	Luke	was	on	holiday	in	the	
Caribbean.	He	decided	to	have	lunch	in	a	
restaurant	near	his	hotel	recommended	
by	locals.	Although	the	restaurant	was	
very	busy,	Luke	thought	the	service	was	
excellent	and	greatly	enjoyed	the	food.	
Despite	his	waiter	being	tied	up	with	
another	customer,	Luke	decided	to	wait	
until	he	was	available	to	offer	him	great	
praise	and	a	large	tip.	Later	on	that	
evening,	Luke	decided	go	for	a	swim	in	
the	ocean.	
	
Steve	was	riding	on	the	London	
Underground	to	St.	James’s	park	to	meet	
his	girlfriend	for	a	pleasant	outdoor	picnic	
in	the	park.	Earlier	that	day,	the	weather	
forecast	had	warned	of	a	50/50	chance	of	
thunderstorms.	While	at	a	stop,	a	frail	old	
lady	entered	the	same	carriage	occupied	
by	Steve.	Instead	of	getting	up	and	
offering	his	seat,	Steve	scowled	at	the	old	
lady	and	refused	to	give	up	his	seat.	
Additional	outcome	information:	
	
1.	While	swimming,	Luke	found	a	$100	bill	
buried	in	the	sand	at	the	beach.	
	
2.	While	swimming,	the	current	carried	
Luke	away	and	he	drowned.	
Additional	outcome	information:	
	
1.	When	Steve	emerged	from	the	
Underground,	he	looked	up	and	observed	
that	the	sky	was	clear	and	the	sun	was	
shining.	
	
2.	When	Steve	emerged	from	the	
Underground,	he	looked	up	and	observed	
a	grey,	cloudy	sky	from	which	rain	was	
pouring	down.	
A	week	ago,	Jenny	was	walking	along	the	
River	Wye	when	she	spotted	a	puppy	
drowning	in	the	river.	Risking	her	own	
life,	Jenny	dived	into	the	river	and	saved	
the	puppy	from	drowning.	
Last	week,	Sally	was	in	a	greengrocers	
buying	fruit	and	vegetables.	After	paying,	
she	made	sure	that	no	one	was	looking,	
and	stole	all	the	change	from	a	charity	
collection	that	was	on	display	at	the	
counter.	
	
Additional	outcome	information:	
	
1.	One	week	later,	Jenny	was	sitting	in	her	
living	room	when	she	received	news	that	
she	had	won	a	new	car	in	a	sweepstake	
she	had	entered.	
	
2.	One	week	later,	Jenny	was	sitting	in	her	
living	room	when	she	received	news	that	
her	husband	was	in	a	terrible	car	accident.	
Additional	outcome	information:	
	
1.	On	her	way	out	of	the	greengrocers,	
Sally	was	approached	by	a	man	who	
offered	her	free	samples	of	the	food	on	
offer	in	his	delicatessen	across	the	road.	
	
2.	On	her	way	out	of	the	greengrocers,	
Sally	was	approached	by	a	man	who	
mugged	her,	stealing	her	bag	containing	
her	purse	and	phone	among	other	
possessions.	
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Table	S1.	Ratings	of	deservingness	of	outcomes	by	a	separate	sample	of	MTurk	participants	(N	=	49,	
n		=	1	removed	for	having	a	duplicate	IP	address;	36.70%	females;	Mage	=	34.55;	SDage	=	9.62)	for	each	
of	the	outcomes	by	scenario	we	used	in	Study	1	(presented	in	a	random	order).	Participants	made	
ratings	for	each	of	the	outcomes	and	scenarios	(cf.	Study	1	in	the	main	text),	and	their	ratings	of	
deservingness	were	made	on	a	7	point	scale	(e.g.,	“To	what	extent	do	you	believe	Jenny	deserves	to	
win	a	new	car	in	a	sweepstake	she	enters?”;	1	=	not	at	all	deserving	to	7	=	very	deserving).	
	
Scenario	 Good	Outcome	M	(SD)	
Bad	Outcome	
M	(SD)	 t	(p)	 dz	
Luke	left	a	tip	 4.39	(1.38)	 1.31	(0.98)	 11.61	(<	.001)	 1.66	
Jenny	saved	puppy	 4.69	(1.49)	 1.41	(1.12)	 11.68	(<	.001)	 1.67	
Steve	mean	to	lady	 1.98	(0.99)	 4.57	(1.51)	 -8.98	(<	.001)	 -1.28	
Sally	stole	change	 1.60	(1.07)	 3.13	(1.75)	 -4.76	(<	.001)	 -0.68	
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Study	2	
The	short	stories	and	the	additional	outcome	information	used	in	Study	2	.	Good	outcome	
information	is	numbered	1	and	bad	outcome	information	is	numbered	2.		
	
Good	person	 Bad	person	
	
A	week	ago,	Geoff	was	walking	along	the	
River	Wye	when	he	spotted	a	puppy	
drowning	in	the	river.	Risking	his	own	life,	
Geoff	dived	into	the	river	and	saved	the	
puppy	from	drowning.	
	
	
A	week	ago,	Geoff	was	walking	along	the	
River	Wye	when	he	spotted	a	puppy	along	
the	bank	of	the	river.	With	no	regard	for	
its	life,	Geoff	picked	up	the	puppy	and	
threw	it	in	the	river.	
	
	
Additional	outcome	information:	
	
1.	Geoff	was	sitting	in	his	living	room	when	he	received	news	that	he	had	won	a	new	car	in	a	
sweepstake	he	had	entered.	
	
2.	Geoff	was	in	a	terrible	car	accident	that	left	him	in	hospital	in	a	serious	condition.	
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Study	3	
The	short	stories	and	the	additional	outcome	information	used	in	Study	3.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Additional	outcome	information:	
	 	
Good	person	 Bad	person	
	
A	week	ago,	Chris	was	walking	along	the	
River	Wye	when	he	spotted	a	puppy	
drowning	in	the	river.	Risking	his	own	life,	
Chris	dived	into	the	river	and	saved	the	
puppy	from	drowning.	
	
	
A	week	ago,	Chris	was	walking	along	the	
River	Wye	when	he	spotted	a	puppy	along	
the	bank	of	the	river.	With	no	regard	for	
its	life,	Chris	picked	up	the	puppy	and	
forcefully	drowned	it	in	the	river	
	
Good	outcomes	 Bad	outcomes	
	
• Chris’s	stocks	and	shares	
skyrocketed	
	
• Chris	won	$100,000	playing	a	
scratchcard	lottery	ticket	
	
• Chris	was	given	a	major	promotion	
at	work	
	
• Chris	won	a	luxury	cruise	trip	
	
• Chris	was	injured	in	a	car	accident	
	
• Chris	was	fired	from	his	job	
	
• Chris	contracted	a	major	illness	
	
• Chris’s	ground-floor	apartment	
was	destroyed	by	flooding	
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Study	4	
The	short	stories	and	additional	outcome	information	used	in	Study	4.		
	
Good	person	 Bad	person	
	
Last	week,	Sally	was	in	a	corner	store	
buying	bread	and	milk.	After	paying,	she	
made	sure	that	no	one	was	looking	and	
put	all	of	her	spare	change	into	a	charity	
collection	that	was	on	display	at	the	
counter.	
	
Last	week,	Sally	was	in	a	corner	store	
buying	bread	and	milk.	After	paying,	she	
made	sure	that	no	one	was	looking	and	
stole	all	the	change	from	a	charity	
collection	that	was	on	display	at	the	
counter.	
	
	
Additional	outcome	information:	
	 	
Good	outcomes	 Bad	outcomes	 Neutral	outcomes	
	
• Sally’s	stocks	and	shares	
skyrocketed	
	
• Sally	won	$1,000	playing	
a	scratch	card	lottery	
ticket	
	
• Sally	was	given	a	major	
promotion	at	work	
	
• Sally	was	injured	in	a	car	
accident	
	
• Sally’s	ground-floor	
apartment	was	flooded	
	
• Sally	came	down	with	a	
serious	illness	
	
• Sally	went	to	a	
concert	
	
• Sally	started	
writing	a	new	
blog	
	
• Sally	tidied	up	
her	office	
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Study	5	
The	short	stories	and	additional	outcome	information	used	in	Study	5.	Good	outcome	information	is	
numbered	1	and	bad	outcome	information	is	numbered	2.	
	
Good	person	 Bad	person	
	
Last	Summer,	Luke	was	on	holiday	in	the	
Caribbean	having	lunch	in	a	restaurant	
near	his	hotel.	Although	the	restaurant	
was	very	busy,	Luke	thought	the	service	
was	excellent	and	greatly	enjoyed	the	
food.	Despite	his	waiter	being	tied	up	with	
another	customer,	Luke	decided	to	wait	
until	he	was	available	to	offer	him	great	
praise	and	a	large	tip.		
	
	
Steve	was	riding	on	the	London	
Underground	to	St.	James’s	park	to	meet	
his	girlfriend	for	a	pleasant	outdoor	picnic	
in	the	park.	While	at	a	stop,	a	frail	old	lady	
entered	the	same	carriage	occupied	by	
Steve.	Instead	of	getting	up	and	offering	
his	seat,	Steve	scowled	at	the	old	lady	and	
refused	to	give	up	his	seat.	
Additional	outcome	information:	
	
1.	While	swimming,	Luke	found	$100	bill	
buried	in	the	sand	at	the	beach.	
	
2.	While	swimming,	the	current	carried	
Luke	away	and	he	drowned.	
Additional	outcome	information:	
	
1.	When	Steve	emerged	from	the	
Underground,	he	looked	up	and	observed	
that	the	sky	was	clear	and	the	sun	was	
shining.	
	
2.	When	Steve	emerged	from	the	
Underground,	he	looked	up	and	observed	
a	gray,	cloudy	sky	from	which	rain	was	
pouring	down.	
	
	
A	week	ago,	Jenny	was	walking	along	the	
River	Wye	when	she	spotted	a	puppy	
drowning	in	the	river.	Risking	her	own	
life,	Jenny	dived	into	the	river	and	saved	
the	puppy	from	drowning.	
	
	
Last	week,	Sally	was	in	a	greengrocers	
buying	fruit	and	vegetables.	After	paying,	
she	made	sure	that	no	one	was	looking,	
and	stole	all	the	change	from	a	charity	
collection	that	was	on	display	at	the	
counter.	
	
Additional	outcome	information:	
	
1.	Jenny	was	sitting	in	her	living	room	
when	she	received	news	that	she	had	won	
a	new	car	in	a	sweepstake	she	had	
entered.	
	
2.	Jenny	was	in	a	terrible	car	accident	that	
left	her	in	hospital	in	serious	condition.	
Additional	outcome	information:	
	
1.	On	her	way	out	of	the	greengrocers,	
Sally	was	approached	by	a	man	who	
offered	her	free	samples	of	the	food	on	
offer	in	his	delicatessen	across	the	road.	
	
2.	On	her	way	out	of	the	greengrocers,	
Sally	was	approached	by	a	man	who	
mugged	her,	stealing	her	bag	containing	
her	purse	and	phone	among	other	
possessions.	
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Study	6	
The	short	story,	instructions,	and	the	additional	outcome	information	used	in	Study	6.		
	
Bad	person	
	
A	week	ago,	Geoff	was	walking	along	the	
River	Wye	when	he	spotted	a	puppy	along	
the	bank	of	the	river.	With	no	regard	for	
its	life,	Geoff	picked	up	the	puppy	and	
threw	it	in	the	river.	
	
	
Instructions:	
	
On	the	next	page	you	will	see	a	busy	array	of	different	shapes	-	including	the	two	below.	
	
The	two	shapes	below	represent	different	pieces	of	information	you	can	receive	later	in	this	survey	
about	the	narrative	above	(please	read	it	again,	just	to	be	sure).	
	
Please	REMEMBER	and	then,	on	the	following	page,	search	for	and	CLICK	on	the	shape	which	
represents	the	information	you	want	to	receive	additional	details	about	later	in	the	survey.	
	
Which	piece	of	additional	information	would	you	like	to	read	more	about	concerning	the	above	
story?	
	
Note	that	both	shapes	can	actually	be	found	in	the	visual	array,	so	it's	important	that	you	search	
for	and	click	on	the	shape	you	want.	
	
Please	click	the	next	button	to	search	for	and	select	the	shape	associated	with	the	additional	
information	you	want	to	review	about	this	story.	
	
Additional	outcome	information	(associated	either	with	an	easy-	or	hard-to-find	shape):	
	
1.	Geoff	was	sitting	in	his	living	room	when	he	received	news	that	he	had	won	a	new	car	in	a	
sweepstake	he	had	entered.	
	
2.	Geoff	was	in	a	terrible	car	accident	that	left	him	in	hospital	in	a	serious	condition.	
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Study	7	
The	short	stories	and	additional	outcome	information	used	in	Study	7.		Good	outcome	information	is	
numbered	1	and	bad	outcome	information	is	numbered	2.	
	
Deservingness	not	affirmed	 Deservingness	affirmed	
Last	week,	Sally	was	in	a	corner	store	buying	
bread	and	milk.	After	paying,	she	made	sure	
that	no	one	was	looking,	and	stole	all	the	
change	from	a	charity	collection	that	was	on	
display	at	the	counter.	
Last	week,	Sally	was	in	a	corner	store	buying	
bread	and	milk.	After	paying,	she	made	sure	
that	no	one	was	looking,	and	stole	all	the	
change	from	a	charity	collection	that	was	on	
display	at	the	counter.	
	 	
On	her	way	out	of	the	store,	Sally	was	
approached	by	a	man	who	mugged	and	
assaulted	her,	smashing	her	face	to	the	ground	
and	stealing	her	purse	containing	her	cell	phone	
and	other	valuable	possessions.	
Additional	outcome	information:	
1. Sally	won	a	luxury	cruise	trip	in	an	online	sweepstakes	she	entered	
2. Sally	came	down	with	a	serious	illness	
	
Deservingness	not	affirmed	 Deservingness	affirmed	
Steve	was	riding	on	the	subway.	While	at	a	
stop,	a	frail	old	lady	entered	the	same	carriage	
occupied	by	Steve.	Instead	of	getting	up	and	
offering	his	seat,	Steve	scowled	at	the	old	lady,	
called	her	names,	and	refused	to	give	up	his	
seat.	
	
Steve	was	riding	on	the	subway.	While	at	a	
stop,	a	frail	old	lady	entered	the	same	carriage	
occupied	by	Steve.	Instead	of	getting	up	and	
offering	his	seat,	Steve	scowled	at	the	old	lady,	
called	her	names,	and	refused	to	give	up	his	
seat.	
	
Steve	was	crossing	the	street	after	leaving	the	
subway	when	he	was	struck	by	a	taxi	running	a	
red	light.	Steve	survived	the	incident	but	lost	
the	use	of	his	legs.	
	 	
	
Additional	outcome	information:	
1. Steve	won	$10,000	playing	a	scratch-card	lottery	ticket	
2. Steve’s	ground	floor	apartment	was	destroyed	by	flooding	
	
 
	
